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Charles W. Roe

U. S. - BRAZILIAN MILITARY
COOPERATION IN WORLD WAR TWO.

Thesis
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U.S. - BRAZILIAN MILITARY COOPERATION IN WORLD WAR TWO

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Requirements For The Degree Of Master Of
Arts In Law And Diplomacy

Charles W. Roe
Prof. Ruhl J. Barlett
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See also Mr. Roe's other paper: "The Brazilian Policy Decision" also in support of this degree

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PREFACE

The United States is facing an ominous challenge in Southeast Asia in the form of guerrilla warfare which it is attempting to meet by the commitment of large numbers of american troops, aircraft, and naval forces. Moreover, intensive effort is being directed in the political and economic areas in order that a viable, relatively stable and democratically oriented government may eventually be in a position to undertake the requisite measures for ensuring a peaceful, evolutionary development of South Viet Nam.

The interesting aspect of this commitment is the fact that United States forces are operating in an overseas area in conjunction with foreign troops which, for the most part represent an alien culture, speak a different language and are members of the armed forces of newly emerging nations, primarily South Viet Nam and Korea. In addition, the administration appears to be exerting subtle diplomatic pressures on its allies to send forces to assist in the struggle or increase their commitments, if already involved. The present situation is similar in many facets to that faced by the U.S. in the prosecution of the Korean War and World War Two.

Many questions arise as a result of joint military action by United States forces and foreign troops of the aforementioned type which remain unanswered. For example:

Are joint military operations advantageous to both the U.S. and the nation concerned in the political, economic and social as well as military areas? What are the long-range implications of joint military action with newly emerging nations? How effective are joint operations considering the problems of language, logistics, training and coordination?

Preliminary judgment in most cases would indicate that the advantages far outweigh the disadvantages. However, I believe that careful analysis of instances of past military cooperation may provide some insight into the problems. The U.S., as a result, might revise its approach so as to avoid achieving short-run military gains at the expense of long-run achievements enhancing political stability, economic development and social change in an underdeveloped country.

With this in mind, I decided to analyze U.S. - Brazilian military cooperation during World War Two, primarily because of the fact that Brazil in the period 1939-1945 epitomized the underdeveloped nation eager to flex its muscles on the international scene. In addition, Brazil, by virtue of its size, population and geographical location will most assuredly exercise a pervasive influence throughout the South American continent in the years to come. This, in the final analysis, may provide the solution to the problem that has plagued the United States throughout its history of

diplomatic relations with our neighbors to the south. The problem being that of exercising influence in South America without raising the twin spectres of intervention and Yankee imperialism.

I am firmly committed to the concept of the "target approach" which conceives of the influence, resources and diplomacy of a nation being directed primarily at core countries with a spinoff sifting throughout the surrounding areas so that the benefits of our efforts accrue, not only to the nation directly concerned, but to contiguous areas and the U.S. as well. In this manner, policy objectives in sensitive areas could be achieved without the rancor and xenophobic reaction inherent in a scatteration approach which, by necessity, invaribly involves the U.S. in close relationships with the very small, impotent countries that have a tendency to over-react to the imagined threat from the leader of the international order.

This paper is an attempt at an examination and analysis of U.S. - Brazilian relations in the period immediately preceding and during World War Two. Attention is focused on the role of Brazil in western hemispheric defense, the axis threat, the response it evoked, the policy decision to declare war by Brazil and the factors influencing the decision. Emphasis is also directed toward the actual military cooperation during the war and a summation of the effects of this cooperation.

[illegible] relations still-our reference to the world. The article takes stock of sociological techniques in order analyze studies the role models of individuals and Turkish institutions.

I am highly indebted to the memory of the "Turkish Yesterday" which accounts of the in-depth, sociologist and historian or a nation being classified culturally at some essential role [illegible] attitude towards the structuring areas so that the complex of the attitude leaders, and only in the nation directly concerned, yet to predominant areas and the not, in call. In this manner, motor dominant in institutions which could be modified religious life patterns and economic relation learned in a revolutionary approach model of commodity, institute involves the U.S. in close relationship with the very small, idealized domestic that have a tendency to over-boom in this limited times from the leader of the international order.

This paper is an attempt at an examination and analysis of Turk - Brazilian relations in the world Luxurious [illegible] and course that the [illegible] relationship in [illegible] on the role of Brazil in matters [illegible] in [illegible], the [illegible] side theory, the [illegible] of [illegible], the [illegible] relation to [illegible] and the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. Brazil is also diverse [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] and a [illegible] of the [illegible] of this [illegible].

It is anticipated that some answers to the questions previously posed may be provided as well as some profound insight into the problems encountered by the U.S. in attempting to implement its policies during the period in question

Unfortunately, I encountered some difficulty with classified sources concerning the record of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force. One source previously classified due to some remarks that could have been considered derogatory, if viewed without objectivity, was recently declassified. In any case, a thorough examination of the material available provided some indication of the role of the B.E.F., which while not fully based on official records is sufficient for the purpose of this paper.

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Chapter I

PRELUDE TO WAR

STRATEGY OF HEMISPHERIC DEFENSE IN THE ATLANTIC

In any consideration of military cooperation or policy, the primary element for initial analysis must be that of the strategy to be employed in the disposition and use of all resources for the attainment of national objectives.[1] General Albert C. Wedemeyer, USA divided the national resources for strategic purposes into the following categories: political, economic, psychosocial (a combination of psychological and ideological) and military.[2] In the United States, immediately prior to, and during World War Two, all four of these categories were employed in the strategy for the defense of the Western Hemisphere.

The emphasis on total hemispheric defense planning was sparked by the Munich crisis of 1938 and indicated a shift in strategy from the previous policy of a "fortress America" defense. The continental type defense was the only alternative left to the military planners due to the lack of adequate U.S. military forces to enforce the Monroe Doctrine. This new national policy, as recognized by Franklin D.

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1. R. Ernest Dupuy, and Trevor N. Dupuy, Military Heritage of America (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1956), p. 456.

2. Ibid., p. 456.

Roosevelt, required the friendly and active support of all the American nations.[3]

With the new national policy of Western Hemisphere defense uppermost in their minds, joint Army and Navy planners on April 21, 1939 submitted a report which provided the basis for the necessary detailed strategic planning concerning the Atlantic situation. In this report, they concluded that the Axis powers would initially commence an intensive economic penetration of Latin America which would be followed by political interference so as to render the area vulnerable to foreign domination. Thence, they would establish military bases. The first objective would probably be the Natal area on the eastern bulge of Brazil with subsequent attacks against the Panama Canal thereby interdicting the transit of U.S. naval power. The report was approved which provided the go-ahead for detailed war plans to protect the Western Hemisphere.

The basic plans were designated the Rainbow plans. Rainbow One provided for the protection of all United States territory and the remainder of the Western Hemisphere north of a line bisecting South America just below the Peruvian/Brazilian bulges, (Quarter-sphere Defense). Rainbow Two and

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3. Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, (United States Army in World War II, Vol. 1, The Western Hemisphere, 2 Vols., in process Washington, D.C.: Office of Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, United States Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 5.

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [

Three provided for the active defense of American interests in the Western Pacific. Rainbow Four provided for total defense of the Western Hemisphere. Rainbow Five was predicated on the basis of active collaboration with England and France. In addition to fulfilling the requirements of Rainbow One, it contemplated the overseas offensive action by U.S. forces.[4]

In order to implement the Rainbow plans, Rainbow One in particular, it was imperative that base facilities for U.S. use be obtained on the Brazilian bulge in the Natal area. This was necessary, from the viewpoint of the army to forestall the possibility of the requirement for a major effort to dislodge Axis forces, the establishment of which would be precluded by prior U.S. occupation with Brazilian permission. Moreover, aircraft development rendered the Natal area subject to access by axis forces from Dakar and the intervening islands.

The navy was anxious for the bases in the same area in order that essential defense of the continent could be carried out, as Brazilian land forces were not established in Northeast Brazil. Additionally, the Brazilian land, sea

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4. Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, (United States Army World War II, Vol. 1, The Western Hemisphere, 2 Vols., in process Washington, D.C.: Office of Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, United States Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 7-10.

[illegible] provisions [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] to the [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] provisions for [illegible] defense of [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

and air forces in 1939, were incapable of effectively resisting a determined external attack. Although the bases represented a critical requirement for plan implementation, it was almost three years before permission could be obtained to station U.S. forces in the area.[5]

In May 1940, Hitler was on the rampage in Europe and it appeared as if previous conclusions concerning the Axis in Brazil were fast becoming reality. The army planners, in the light of previous planning and the American military forces available, concluded that activities, for at least a year, would have to be limited to offensive-defensive action in South America to defend our interests. The recommendation was made that efforts be concentrated in the South American area to preclude occupation of the European possessions in the hemisphere and to forestall German movement into Brazil.

To implement these recommendations, the Navy drafted the plan "Pot of Gold" which envisaged sending to Brazil 10,000 troops by air to be followed by 100,000 troops by sea, in the event of an emergency initiated by Axis movement toward South America. The plan provided for the use

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5. Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, (United States Army in World War II, Vol. 1, The Western Hemisphere, 2 Vols., in process Washington, D.C.: Office of Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, United States Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 12-13.

and air forces in [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible]
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of four battleships, two carriers, nine cruisers, and three squadrons of destroyers as a protective screen.[6] The air movement was destined for Northeast Brazil with the large force slated for Rio de Janeiro. Of course, facilities for movement by air were inadequate, as well as available army and navy forces. However, the scope of the planning is indicative of the key role that Brazil played in United States plans.

With the Fall of France in June 1940, the situation, militarily, was critical necessitating new decisions concerning hemispheric defense. President Roosevelt approved a joint memorandum of the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations which provided for the following:

a. Occupation of European possessions in the Western Hemisphere in time to prevent cession to Germany after consultation with the American Republics.

b. Plans for occupation of strategic Caribbean, South and Central American possessions when provided for by negotiation.

c. The utilization of United States armed forces to support existing governments as required.

d. The supply of munitions to Latin American countries at intervals and the granting of credits for their purchase.

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6. Mark Skinner Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, (Vol. 1, The United States Army in Hemisphere Defense, 6 Vols., The War Department, in process, Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, Department of the Army, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 96.

of four sections, two supplies, one repairs, and three sections of division or a projectile section.[6] The air section was assigned the mission of protecting the large force (20,000 men in 3 divisions). Of course, flexibility in movement is the very lifeblood, so that as events move one may [illegible]. However, the range of the planning is indicative of the [illegible] level in Allied [illegible].

This was the fall of France in June 1940. The situation, briefly, was critical; the British [illegible] were [illegible] commercial [illegible] [illegible]. Therefore [illegible] [illegible] of the [illegible] of [illegible] and [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

e. The economic adjustment of United States/ Latin American economic relations.[7]

In essence, these recommendations provided the basis for our policy in regard to United States-Latin American cooperation in the implementation of hemispheric defense strategy throughout the war.

The fundamental objective of this strategy in the Atlantic was, first and foremost, United States continental defense, which in turn was based on protection of the Panama Canal. To ensure this protection, reliance was, by virtue of geographical necessity, placed on the cooperation of Brazil and thence by projection, across the straits of the South Atlantic to Africa. In this schema, the United States was the anchor for a chain consisting of the canal, Brazil and French West Africa. A weak link would have rendered useless the strategy and plans formulated, and later employed, which led to the successful conclusion of the war. Fortunately, Brazil did not prove to be that weak link, although for a lengthy period, we had our doubts.

UNITED STATES POLICY OBJECTIVES IN BRAZIL

In support of the strategy of hemispheric defense, the United States pursued some basic policy objectives toward Latin America which included (1) the elimination of the Nazi threat of subversion, (2) hemispheric unity,

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7. Conn and Fairchild, The Framework of Hemispheric Defense, Vol. 1, The Western Hemisphere, pp. 38-39.

c. The economic [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] economic [illegible].

In summary, these [illegible] [illegible] provided the basis for our ability to [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

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(3) maximum utilization of the defense capability of Brazil, (4) political stability, (5) the use of strategic bases and (6) the full use of strategic resources.[8] In short, the objectives were aimed at ensuring the wholehearted support of U.S. policy in the prosecution of the war, but stopping short of requiring their sending forces overseas. This was primarily a result of the fact that United States arms production, initially, couldn't meet the demand of our own forces. Brazilian arms production was almost negligible, so any equipment required would have had to come from the U.S. Later in the war, this proved feasible under the Lend-Lease programs.

The threat of foreign subversion was initially recognized in two areas: that of economic penetration and the predominance of Axis airlines throughout Brazil. At the Havana Conference, 1940, the necessity for countering German influence in trade was recognized as an immediate objective.[9] German commercial penetration had been subsidized through compensation by the Reich which allowed German merchants to undercut United States prices 10 to 40

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8. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Post World War II Political Development in Latin America, 86th Cong., 1st sess., Senate Rept. No. 1, (Washington, 1959), p. 29.

9. "Havana Conference of 1940," Foreign Policy Reports, September 15, 1940, p. 136.

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8. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Post World War II Military Development in Latin America, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., (Staff Study, No. 1, (Washington, 1955), p. 27.

9. "Russian Intervene at 100," Latin Times Weekly, Sept.-Nov. 15, 1960, p. 32.

percent.[10] Businessmen in Brazil were receiving colossal orders at higher export prices. The situation relected the best of two worlds-buying at lower and selling at higher prices. Since economic penetration was but a first step, United States policy had to be directed toward its reduction.

The pervasive influence of the Axis airlines was pointedly brought to light by an article in the Nation in 1937, which pointed out the extent to which the Brazilian air transportation system was dominated by airlines, either operated by German firms or indirectly controlled by them. This was significant as a factor in the economic penetration of Brazil, but of more importance was the fact that the control of the airways enabled Germany to exercise its influence in a military sense by mapping Brazil, controlling the training of national pilots and conducting reconnaissance in the event of war. For these reasons, reduction of this threat to an acceptable level was one of the first priorities.

Hemispheric unity was essential for the solution of the problem of guarding the hemisphere. Georgraphy couldn't be altered, therefore it had to be integrated into a system capable of sustaining the shocks of a major war threatening

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10. Nathan Weyl, "Swastika Over Brazil," Nation, November 13, 1937.

person.[10] Wednesday is "still more than any other leader a little round child." The Alliance retained the form of the anti-Soviet [illegible] and [illegible] as [illegible] plans. Since [illegible] Yeltsin was in a first step, Gorbachev's policy has to be [illegible] [illegible] reduction.

The personality influence of the sole airliner was [illegible] brought to bear [illegible] in the Spring of 1987. Much pointed out the [illegible] the civilian air transportation [illegible] the [illegible] by pilots, military operated [illegible] or [illegible] controlled [illegible]. This was [illegible] in [illegible] the economic [illegible] of peace, but [illegible] the [illegible] that the [illegible] control of the airline [illegible] to [illegible] life interests in a [illegible] [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] the [illegible] of military [illegible] and [illegible] preparedness in the [illegible] of war. The [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] of this [illegible] in a [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] priorities.

Gorbachev [illegible] was essential for the solution of the problem of [illegible] the [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] it [illegible] to be [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible]

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10. Bruce [illegible], "[illegible] Does [illegible]," Time, [illegible] 10, 1987.

not only the western continent, but democracy as well.

The defensive capabilities of Brazil were, for all practical purposes, strictly limited to defensive action in the industrial south which also included large numbers of foreign minority groups. The northeast was defenseless and what was worse, the only means of re-enforcing the area was by coastal shipping, since passable highways were non-existent. Brazil's army was one of the largest in South America, but poorly equipped for a major military attack. The navy was small, consisting primarily of coastal defense ships with a few capital ships of ancient vintage. President Vargas in commenting on the navy referred to it as an anachronism.

Since Brazil was the keystone of the armys hemispheric defense in the Atlantic, as well as vital to the naval mission of protecting the Dakar straits, most of the diplomacy until Brazil entered the war, was directed toward achieving the use of bases. The other objectives, insofar as Brazil was concerned, were relatively easy to obtain under the threat of war, but the base question intertwined with the question of sovereignty. This was especially true in Brazil as well as the remainder of Latin America, for the fear of intervention remained strong even during the war when there was speculation that the bases would not be vacated when they were no longer needed.

Political stability under the Vargas regime was a relatively minor problem in our relations, for he had been in power since the revolution of 1930. Although pressures were often exerted in an effort to remove him from office, one being an armed attack on his life, none were successful until after the war. In fact, Vargas had crushed the Integralist (Fascist) movement in 1937. The armed forces supported him in power, but tried to influence him against the Allies. The question of which way he would shift wasn't answered until 1942, although previous indications were that he would favor the Allies.

The policy of obtaining access to the storehouse of strategic materials located in Brazil was of vital importance as the war progressed, for sources of supply for materials such as mica, quartz crystal,and rubber were controlled by the Japanese.

In the pursuit of these policy objectives, it was realized that durable Good Neighbor relations were impossible except on a reciprocal basis. Therefore, the attempt was made during the war to reciprocate for Brazilian support, the success of which can be measured by the achievement of all our policy objectives as well as by the joint military efforts against the Axis.

Military operations since the Korean conflict have a relatively minor impact on my profession, for it has been in those years the evolution of CONUS. Strategic movements were often minimal in nature as troops the line drive, and being on ground alerts on the site, some were successful until after the war. In 1957, Korea had crossed the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) twice in 1957. The armed forces supported at the time, and helped to introduce the Korean civilian. The changing of units and so could only have been accomplished until 1960, although previous indications were that it would cover the civilian.

The notion of obtaining issues in the direction of strategic activity locally in Seoul for of this! Importance in the air perspective, the process of supply for materials work in site, supply materials, and other were accomplished in the Japanese.

In this manner to take a major defensive. It was realized that during Good Conduct relations were impossible except on a traditional basis. Therefore, the attempt was made during the war to establish for Brigadier General, the process of which was to be accomplished by the relations of all our major objectives as well as on the clear military efforts against the Axis.

EVOLUTION OF U.S. - BRAZILIAN PARTNERSHIP

Early Pan-Americanism was a reflection of the desire to maintain peace within the hemisphere instead of guarding it from abroad.[11] The United States record toward Latin America in this regard was not the best, not that we engaged in warfare with our neighbors, but that the whole tenor of our Latin American relations suffered from the measures taken primarily to protect the Caribbean area under the aegis of the Monroe Doctrine. The measures were interpreted as a hypocritical device for the annexation of territory in most of the twenty republics.[12]

Our diplomatic relations were a moderate success in the era of the Good Neighbor Policy in the decade prior to World War Two. At the Seventh Inter-American Conference in Montivideo in 1933, the United States surrendered the right of intervention, but with an important and little noticed reservation.[13] This reservation, appended by Secretary Hull, was designed to retain the right of intervention in cases of dispute wherein the United States would be guided by the rules of international law.[14]

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11. John I. B. McCulloch, "Challenge to the Americas," (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1940), p. 7.

12. Duncan Aikman, The All-American Front, (New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 1941), p. 7.

13. Arthur P. Whitaker, ed., Inter-American Affairs, An Annual Survey, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943), p. 6.

14. Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, (Fourth ed., New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1955), p. 765.

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Large [illegible] of the United States by making [illegible] investment or [illegible] in [illegible].[11] In regard [illegible] United States [illegible] in [illegible] relations in our [illegible], we [illegible] in [illegible] relations, we [illegible] some [illegible] our [illegible] relations [illegible] first the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

The Special Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace at Buenos Aires in 1936 adopted a protocol which renounced intervention for any reason thereby rectifying the defect of 1933 reservation.[15]

At the Pan-American Congress at Lima in 1938, the dominant Latin American states joined together to dilute the efforts of Hull to promote a united front, but did manage to provide for emergency action by a stipulation for the meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

Our economic relations were hindered by involvement in domestic politics, trade relations were handicapped by fiscal irresponsibility of many Latin American nations and for the most part, intellectual contects were devoid of any real substance.

However, in spite of the difficultiesin our diplomatic relations, each conference marked an improvement in relations, for the stage had been set by the Good Neighbor policy. This policy allayed the fear of U.S. domination, reduced resentment over United States intervention, and sharpened the awareness of Latin Americans of their special importance to their northern neighbor.[16] In addition to the

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15. Duncan Aikman, The All-American Front, (New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, 1941), p. 8.

16. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States-Latin American Relations, 86th Cong., 2nd sess., Senate Report, No. 125 (Washington, 1960), p. 3.

[illegible]

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15. [illegible]

16. [illegible]

renunciation of intervention, the collapse of world security provided the impetus for a genuine Pan-Americanism, for all the nations were desirous of retaining their independence.

Brazil, having participated in the diplomacy of the Good Neighbor era, and following an official policy of neutrality, was anxious to participate in the Inter-American Conferences of 1939, 1940 and 1942.

In the sphere of military relations, little contact was had with Brazil during the period of growing world tension in the thirties. Relations were maintained through an exchange of military attaches prior to 1939 and a four-man United States Military Mission, since 1934, which conducted training in coast defense, ordnance, and chemical warfare. The navy had a similar thirteen man mission conducting training with the Brazilian Navy.[16]

This lack of contact was a result of United States reluctance to give any indication of military intrusion in furtherance of its military mission of continental defense.[17] In contrast, German and Italian military missions were active throughout Latin America and particularly in Brazil, for they considered their military activities as a means of influencing governmental policies. This was a potentially dangerous situation, since the Axis nations did not have to labor under

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16. Conn and Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, p. 267.

17. Ibid., p. 173.

[illegible] of [illegible] the [illegible] of social [illegible] [illegible] for a [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

the handicap of previous diplomatic history as did the United States. Additionally, major arms purchases were made by Brazil in Germany which accounted for the largest percentage of its equipment being supplied by the Axis.

The lead in counteracting this influence was supplied by the State Department in 1938, by convening an informal inter-departmental conference to suggest ways and means of improving relations. An outgrowth of the meeting was the suggestion for training more Latin American officers in the U.S., visits of air and naval units to Latin America, the sending of military publications to military libraries and visits by high-ranking officers to the United States. The War Department implemented these suggestions and in addition, began to actively promote the sale of munitions to Latin America.[18]

Hitler, in his efforts to maintain a position in Brazil, extended an invitation to General Pedro Amelio Goes Monteiro, the Brazilian Chief of Staff, to visit Berlin. He was prepared to offer him the compliment of marching down the Unter der Linden at the head of a crack regiment. While General Monteiro was highly flattered and debating an acceptance, Undersecretary of State, Sumner Welles learned of the invitation and extended a counter-proposal to make a visit to the United States. In fact, he proposed that General Marshall visit Brazil and General Monteiro return

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18. Conn and Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, p. 174.

the condition of [illegible] [illegible] in the [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] made to [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

with him on a United States warship.[19] General Marshall made the trip to Brazil on the light cruiser Nashville, arriving on May 24, 1939. In mid-June, General Monteiro accompanied General Marshall to the United States.

This exchange of visits, while not accomplishing much in the way of actual military cooperation, did provide for closer collaboration between the two nations.

The outbreak of the European war in 1939 provided an impetus to the American Republics to cooperate which was speedily transformed into action at the meeting of Foreign Ministers in Panama on September 23, 1939. The important resolutions adopted at this meeting consisted of one creating a neutrality belt around the American Republics for a distance of several hundred miles. A second created an Inter-American Economic and Financial Advisory Committee whose function would be to discuss and recommend measures to alleviate the stresses in economic life caused by the war.[20] A third resolution provided for a meeting in case of danger arising from a change in sovereignty of a European possession in the Western Hemisphere.

This resolution led to the Havana Meeting of July, 1940 which confirmed the non-transfer principle and provided by resolution for acting in concert, to occupy on a temporary basis colonial possessions of a non-American power, if

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19. The New York Times Magazine, May 22, 1939.

20. Lawrence Duggan, The Americas; The Search for Hemisphere Security, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1949), pp. 82-83.

threatened by any other non-American power. In effect, concern was being directed at British, French and Dutch possessions in the event of a German threat to seize them. In addition, they signed a resolution on collective security (an act of aggression against one is an attack against all) and agreed to meet to decide defensive measures.

The meetings and the resolutions agreed upon were vital, not only to the United States, but particularly to undefended Brazil. Brazil, facing the South Atlantic and with a long coastline was particularly susceptible to submarine warfare. The European possessions which were causing the most concern were contiguous to Brazil on the northeast which was also undefended. If the area fell into unfriendly hands, the promotion of internal subversion would, in conjunction with foreign minority elements in the South, prove to be a difficult problem to cope with. However, the American republics in support of one another at Panama and Havana had provided the diplomatic basis for further action in the protection of their national interests. The Pan-Americanization of the Monroe Doctrine had now been completed by the conversion of a unilateral policy to a multi-lateral obligation.[21]

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21. Dorothy Burne Goebel, ed., American Foreign Policy Documents, (New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1961), p. 267.

tions based on non-Euro-American premises. In effect, according the Arabs dignity in political terms and taking seriously their role as a source of power in Arab-Muslim societies, Kissinger's policy (an act of diplomatic history has it in stark contrast to all) had caused to wane the Western dominance.

The questions and his predecessors served quite well, not only in his dealing Arabs, but particularly so and of ended Israel. Israel, facing the Arab dilemma and with a long-standing and particularly antipathy to Arabian matters, the Kissinger approaches with was making the most concerns were antagonism to Israel on the assistance which was also undermined. If has also felt role unfriendly about, the possibility of internal reconciliation would, in conjunction with foreign minority elements in Arab lands, prove to be a serious obstacle to deal with. However, the American economics in support of our economy at Israel and Europe had provided the diplomatic basis for Kissinger action in the protection of their national interests. The Kissinger-Brezhnev initiation of the Middle Eastern peace has been provided by the conversion of a unilateral policy to a multi-lateral obligation.[21]

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21. Torsten Nilsson Cornell, ed., Nations Foreign Policy Decisions, (New York: Bell, Hitchcock and Harrison, 1981), p. 1.

While these advances on the diplomatic front had been taking place, the military collaboration between Brazil and the United States still had not reached the point at which a successful defense of Northeast Brazil could be assured. Basically, the problem revolved around a conflict between the desired policy of stationing U.S. forces in Brazil and the Brazilian policy of refraining from granting permission, relying instead on protecting the area with their own forces supplied by the U.S.

Surplus coast defense equipment was offered to Brazil in 1939, most of it obsolete, which offended the Brazilians since they were interested in obtaining modern weapons. During 1941, the United States was more successful in obtaining German weapons for Brazil than in providing U.S. weapons. Weapons purchases had previously been made by Brazil in Germany and were in the process of being shipped in a Brazilian vessel, the Siquiera Campos, when they were intercepted by the British.[22] General Marshall interceded and obtained permission for an American ship to load the arms in Lisbon for transshipment to Brazil. The amount of arms involved was not really significant, and since the U.S. couldn't compensate for the inability of Brazil to obtain German arms, the weapons supply problem exasperated U.S. - Brazilian relations.

Brazilian - U.S. staff agreements were negotiated with

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22. Conn and Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, p. 271.

[illegible]

[illegible] the United States [illegible] which [illegible] assured. Similarly, the Soviet Foreign Minister [illegible] between the United Kingdom of Great Britain [illegible] Brazil and the Soviet Union [illegible] operation, [illegible] to support the Brazil [illegible] under [illegible] 1.3.

During World War II, Brazil was [illegible] in 1917, [illegible] allies [illegible] during 1941, the United States was [illegible] obtaining [illegible] weapons. [illegible] Brazil in [illegible] in a Brazilian vessel, the [illegible] interrupted by the British.[92] [illegible] and obtained [illegible] area in Lisbon for [illegible] to Brazil. The amount of arms imported was not [illegible] Brazil's [illegible] German area, the [illegible] Brazilian relations.

Brazilian - U.S. [illegible] with

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92. Dunn and Fairbrother, The Geography of Brazilian Defense, p. 273.

Brazil in 1940 providing for increased U.S. aid and mutual assistance in the event of armed attack. Brazil agreed to suppress alien activity and provide access to its bases for U.S. Forces. The U.S. promised arms and material to develop Brazilian industry and railroads with payment to be in the form of raw materials.[23]

In July, 1941, the staff agreements became the Brazilian-American Joint Planning Agreement which provided for a joint survey of the northeast and planning for each nations contributions to its defense. The limitations spelled out specifically that a threat had to be recognized by Brazil and that assistance of the U.S. would be for the places and periods as she determined. Moreover, the bases would remain under Brazilian command with U.S. forces as reinforcements.[24]

It can readily be ascertained that even at this late date, July, 1941, there remained the fear of intervention by the U.S., even though the cooperation in other areas had been of enormous assistance. Brazil had approved the construction of eight military bases financed by U.S. funds and had started to move its own armed forces to the northeast for protection of vital installations. In June, 1941, approval

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23. Conn and Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, p. 277.

24. Ibid., p. 290.

Brazil in 1.C.O. provided the necessary [illegible], and the remaining assistance in the form of grant aids. Brazil agreed to [illegible] action against [illegible] to the bonds [illegible] T.C. issues. The U.S. [illegible] and assisted in forming Brazilian interests and individuals who wished it to be the form of the [illegible].[23]

In July, 1961, the Brazil government became the [illegible] Brazilian-American Joint Financial Agreement with provision for a joint survey of the economic and planning for such medium consideration in the [illegible]. The institutions [illegible] for [illegible] but to be [illegible] by Brazil and [illegible] of the U.S. would be for the plans and projects as due [illegible]. Moreover, the [illegible] would result [illegible] [illegible] with U.S. [illegible] as [illegible].[24]

It was [illegible] to [illegible] that [illegible] in this [illegible] year, July, 1961, there [illegible] the fact of [illegible] in the U.S., even [illegible] the [illegible] in other [illegible] had been of [illegible]. Brazil had [illegible] the [illegible] of eight [illegible] [illegible] by U.S. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] in more [illegible] [illegible] to the [illegible] for [illegible] in [illegible] [illegible]. In June, 1961, [illegible]

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23. [illegible], The [illegible] of [illegible], p. [illegible].

24. Ibid., p. 109.

was obtained for U.S. use of the "victory corridor" and the use of Recife and Bahia as operating bases for the U.S. Navy.

In October, 1941, a joint military board was proposed by Brazil which was approved and placed in operation on January 14, 1942. The function of the board was to supervise construction of new facilities in the northeast. By now, the U.S. was engaged in the war and the continuing problem of introduction of U.S. forces into Brazil had still not been solved.

At the instigation of the United States, a meeting of Foreign Ministers was called for Rio de Janiero in January 1942, to determine action as a result of the Axis aggression. The meeting resulted in Brazil breaking diplomatic relations with the Axis and joint outlining of means for improving hemispheric defense measures, in addition to the cooperative mobilization of economic resources for mutual benefits.

Previously, the Brazilian government had maintained a position which reflected an ideological affinity of the Estado Novo (New state) with the European dictatorships. This had hindered the unreserved cooperation with the U.S. Another hindrance to full cooperation was the retention of both pro-U.S. and pro-Axis elements in the government in a political balancing act designed to ensure support from all elements. This forced a compromise at the Rio conference as

the U.S. had been promoting unanimous severance of diplomatic relations to block the propaganda output, which was opposed by Chile and Argentina. The compromise "recommended" that the American republics break diplomatic relations, thereby ensuring unanimity, satisfying the United States and providing a concession to the Brazilians which would placate the wavering army officers of that country.[25]

In March 1942, the United States and Brazil negotiated a series of agreements embodied in diplomatic notes and business contracts. In the agreements, new measures of economic assistance were provided for, as well as a new lend-lease agreement calling for delivery of arms to Brazil with a value of $200,000,000 which was double the amount previously arranged for in 1941. Concurrently, the army agreed to deliver 100 medium tanks, more than 200 light tanks, fifty combat aircraft, antiaircraft and antitank guns.[26]

The economic agreements provided for the mobilization of Brazil's strategic resources by providing $100,000,000 for the purpose. A $5,000,000 fund was established by the Rubber Reserve Company (U.S. government agency) to be used in collaboration with the Brazilian government in the stimulation of raw rubber production. The last agreement

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25. Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America From Beginning To Present, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 806.

26. Conn and Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, p. 316.

the U.S. had been probable recipients of diplomatic pressure to join the Japanese group, which was opposed by Britain and Canada. The Japanese "peacemakers" had an ambitious program for Chinese relations, having mentally annexed, anticipating the United States and providing a commission to the Dominions which would classify the strategic raw materials of that country.[25]

In March 1941, the United States and Canada negotiated a series of agreements modified in Canadian favour for Canadian companies. In this agreement, the exchange of economic assistance was provided for, as well as a new Lend-Lease arrangement giving for delivery of more it dealt with a value of 100,000,000 which was double the 1940 phenomenal amount for 1941. Concurrently, the U.S. agreed to deliver 200 medium tanks, more than 100 light tanks, fifty bomber aircraft, antiaircraft and artillery guns.[26]

The economic arrangements provided for the mobilization of Canada's economic resources to provide 180,000,000 for the purpose. A 15,000,000 loan was negotiated by the Polar Security Mission U.S. government agency to be used to collaborate with the Canadian government in the mobilization of raw rubber production. The last arrangement

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25. Robert Darling, A History of Anti-Japanese Sentiment in Canada, (New York: Arlington, 1948), p. 200.

26. John and Hilborg, The Development of Contemporary Canada, p. 316.

provided for the development of iron mines and railroads in Brazil.[27]

The signing of these agreements and the promised delivery of arms resulted in the quick sanction by Brazil for the movement of United States Army maintenance personnel into Northeast Brazil. Shortly thereafter, in May 1942, a Brazilian-American defense agreement was signed coinciding with the fundamental change in U.S. army policy. The policy had shifted from the promotion of measures to place U.S. troops in Brazil, to one supporting the utilization of Brazilian forces for defense with support by the U.S. in the form of training and material.

In June 1942, Hitler decided on a policy of attacking shipping off the northeast coast of Brazil. In the prosecution of these attacks, several Brazilian ships were sunk with heavy loss of life. Brazil countered with a declaration of war and the cooperation that had been covert now became overt. The threat of the axis toward Brazil had now become a reality thereby forging the bonds of military partnership which were to last throughout the war.

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27. David H. Popper, "United States-Brazilian Economic Accords of March 3, 1942," Foreign Policy Reports, March 1942.

Chapter II

THE AXIS THREAT TO BRAZIL

THE REALITY OF THE THREAT

In the thirties, Hitler in a conversation with one of his lieutenants on the question of Brazil stated that "We shall create a new Germany there. We shall find everything we need there."[1] Questioned as to the method for obtaining control of Brazil, he replied, "We shall not land troops like William the Conqueror and gain Brazil by the strength of arms. Our weapons are not visible ones."[2] The Fuhrer was referring to the methods for achieving German objectives which were already available to him.

In Brazil, mountains of coffee were rotting on the wharves, United States balances were blocked and payment on bonds were suspended indefinitely,[3] The German traders had doubled their share of the Brazilian market, mostly at the expense of the British, large German colonies were in existence in Southern Brazil, German controlled airlines were well established and the government of Vargas was semi-fascist in form. While these opportunities existed for the imposition of Axis domination, and they were exploited to the fullest extent, countermeasures by the United States due to the early recognition of the threat, were sufficient to prevent an

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1. Herman Rauching, The Voice of Destruction, (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1940), p. 61.

2. Ibid., p. 63.

3. "Brazil," Fortune, June 1939, pp. 43-52.

Chapter V

THE ROLE OF THE ARMY IN AMERICA

PRESIDENT AS THE TEACHER

In the meantime, during the [illegible] period of the liberation in the [illegible] of Japanese and "we shall remain a war [illegible] time. We shall find everything as near alike." [illegible] in the world for [illegible] control of Israel, he realized, "We shall not lose [illegible] time utilizing the instruments [illegible] by the citizens of [illegible]. The [illegible] are also available now." The [illegible] was attached to the [illegible] [illegible] which were already available to him.

In Israel, [illegible] of [illegible] were [illegible] on the [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] were [illegible] and [illegible] in [illegible] were [illegible].[2] The [illegible] [illegible] had [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

extension of Axis hegemony to this hemisphere.

It has now been established that in 1940 and 1941 there were no specific German plans which envisioned an attack on the Western Hemisphere. Although a logical projection of their Gibralter-African project (code name Felix-Gibralter attack followed by German occupation of North Africa and Dakar), would have subjected Brazil to the full thrust of German military might.[4] Our planners reasoned that the bulge of Brazil, 2,700 miles east of New York was a logical stepping stone westward, if military action were contemplated. The Atlantic, narrows at this point to approximately 1,600 miles with Ascension Island and Fernando de Naronha providing convenient sites for bases in between. The relatively short distance between continents also created an ideal environment for the operation of submarines and the Germans, in fact, controlled the straits for a short period in July and early August of 1942.[5]

The United States thought the German threat was a real one, for all planning for the defense of the hemisphere had taken into account the probability of Axis military action against Brazil. Nevertheless, the Brazilians weren't convinced until their ships were sinking from submarine

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4. Conn and Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, p. 69.

5. Edward Tomlinson, Battle for the Hemisphere, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947), p. 95.

attacks and they didn't relax from this fear until after the United States moved into North Africa, thereby removing the possibility of direct military action.

The reality of the threat was forcefully brought home to the Brazilians when the Allies attacked Africa, for the Brazilians had been expecting bombers and troop planes from the African coast. All of northern Brazil had been on alert, the Brazilian army was manning the beaches and several ancient battleships, not fit for sea duty, had been towed into position at the harbor entrances in Baia and Natal to provide protection.[6]

However, the military threat never became a reality, due primarily to planning and action before the fact by both the United States and Brazil. The more difficult problem to cope with was the threat from within as offensive measures were required rather than defensive, which according to the military tacticians requires greater efforts.

AXIS AIRLINES

One of the most dangerous influences in Brazil, in the years prior to the war, was the network of Axis and Axis controlled airlines. The lines were established in the late twenties and were well entrenched making it difficult for Pan-American Airways to supplant them. By 1938, Pan-

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6. Edward Tomlinson, Battle for the Hemisphere, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947), p. 96.

American was dominant in South America, but held a poor second place in Brazil as most of their operations were in western and central South America. This situation wasn't corrected until the eve of the January 1942 Rio Conference.

The geographical configuration of Brazil with its huge Amazon valley, and the lack of road, rail and water transportation inland, resulted in an inordinate dependency on the air mode of transportation throughout Brazil. The Germans, by controlling this service, were in a position to conduct reconnaissance, acquire potential military air bases, with supporting services, and to provide a nucleus for the formation of a Luftwaffe in the event of war. Many of the routes were maintained into interior areas in Brazil which had no commercial justification and were operated at a pecuniary loss. This was more than compensated for by the military and psychological values derived therefrom.

In general, the Axis airlines could be classified in three categories: (1) Deutsche Lufthansa and Italian LATI which were agencies of their respective governments, (2) the ostensibly national airlines whose management and policies were controlled by Deutsche Lufthansa and (3) Syndicate Condor, a camouflaged offshoot of Deutsche Lufthansa flying the Brazilian flag and receiving a Brazilian governmental subsidy.[7]

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7. Melvin Hall and Walter Peck, "Wings for the Trojan Horse," Foreign Affairs, January, 1941.

Syndicate Condor, the largest airline in South America, was the spearhead for the aerial penetration of Brazil, covering the complete seaboard and maintaining routes into the northern states of Para and Maranhao. Most of the staff were German or naturalized Brazilians. The equipment consisted of sixteen tri-motor Junkers (seventeen passenger), eight older Junkers and two twenty-six passenger Focke-Wulf 200's assigned to Condor by Deutsche Lufthansa when the war interrupted its operations.[8]

Varig, purportedly Brazilian, in reality was an offshoot of Condor with a German staff and equipment.

Vasp, under German control, was primarily staffed by Germans or naturalized Brazilians and operated German equipment.[9]

The influence by these airlines in Brazil radiated throughout South America by connecting with Luthansa in Peru, Sedta in Ecuador, Scadta in Columbia and Aeroposta in Argentina.

After Deutsche Lufthansa suspended operations, its place was taken by the Italian line, Latai which operated until January 1942. It operated from Rio de Janeiro to Rome via the Cape Verdes Islands carrying highly compact,

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8. Melvin Hall and Walter Peck, "Wings for the Trojan Horse," Foreign Affairs, January, 1941.

9. Ibid., p. 350.

Thousands remain, the lowest quality in every sense, and 10% constitute the hard core of unemployables in society. Moreover, the medical and administrative review that the authorities intend to carry out necessary, that is, the staff have forced on unemployed families. The structures established at Jobcentre offices (Employee protection), state other benefits and the income-tax provisions (DOE's estimate is based on Jobcentre officers when the new administrative arrangements).[6]

Thus, potentially beneficial, in reality a defeat of people with a genuine right to assistance.

Then, some income support, the minimum earnings by persons in subsidised work-places and approved training equipment.[7]

The technique of take-a-chance is hardly satisfied. Unemployed could accept or reject the offer of a job, extra in income, since in reality the income is not supplemented.

After operation in Jobcentre employment exchanges, in place and linked to the Jobcentre idea, local social security offices. It operates from this to provide to those who the Jobcentre failure service income support.

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6. Quote and see Alvin Tom, "Plans for the Problem Group," Jobcentre Gazette, January, 1982.

7. Ibid., p. 750.

valuable cargoes such as industrial diamonds, quartz crystals, mica and diplomatic mail. On the inbound trip it carried watch parts, essence of scent from France, films and mail. The fare to Rome was advertised at $2600 thereby discouraging travel and saving space for Axis couriers.[10] An additional service was performed in its circumventing the British blockade by connecting via Condor to Buenos Aires, thence across the Andes to the west coast where Pan-American carried the cargo to the United States.[11] This continued until war commenced with the Axis.

The military danger was illustrated by several documented instances of Axis aircraft deviating from their scheduled routes during the critical period of the early forties. In one instance, British cruisers (Ajax and Exeter) were 75-100 miles off the South American coast and sighted a Condor Focke-Wulf. Upon investigation, it was established that the aircraft had departed on a test flight from Buenos Aires and was unable to furnish a satisfactory explanation upon its return.[12] A second incident involved L.A.T.I. (Italian Line) which left Recife and flew over seven hours to an unknown destination on a flimsy pretext.[13] The fine of

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10. Charles Murphy, "Letter From Recife-Intrigue on the Bulge," Fortune, June, 1941.

11. Ibid., p. 36.

12. Hill and Peck, "Wings for The Trojan Horse," Foreign Affairs, January, 1941, p. 350.

13. John Gunther, Inside Latin America, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1941), p. 389.

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

$1,000 was hardly sufficient to prevent similar machinations, although Brazilian vigilance over their activities was increased. It is perhaps, safe to conclude that there were many unreported incidents of a similar nature that were detrimental to hemispheric security.

In spite of recognition that the airlines posed the greatest potential threat, the efficacy of measures to counteract their influence was hindered by such diverse factors as the necessity of the British allowing L.A.T.I. to operate by not shutting off their supplies of oil and gas at Rio de Oro (refueling stop) by blockade. Apparently, there was a tacit understanding that in return, the Germans would continue to allow the British to fly unimpeded from London to Portugal.[14]

Pan-American, as much as she desired to supplant the German lines throughout South America, was reluctant to cooperate with the United States government in the efforts for erasure of German influence. It was discovered that Pan-American owned 84 percent of Scadta stock (Columbia) which connected with Condor in Brazil, and was content to allow the German government to exercise operating control. It was only after intensive efforts by the State and War Departments, that the situation was rectified. This incident was probably the most flagrant instance of a United States corporation

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14. John Gunther, Inside Latin America, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1941), p. 388.

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refusing to support governmental policy during the period under consideration.[15]

Concerted action began to be applied for removal of the Axis influence in 1938. The first positive measure in 1940 imposed nationality requirements on the German staff. In July, 1941, Condor and LATI were placed on the blacklist by the U.S. Government. Pan-American service was substituted for the German Lines that were nationalized. However, the American service was unable to expand fast enough. Americans were still taking all the available space and the United States was reluctant to sell Brazil new planes and parts which could have compensated for the inability of Pan-American to completely replace the German service.[16]

Soon after Pearl Harbor, there were no Axis owned airlines in South America. Condor, nationalized shortly thereafter, continued under the directorship of Ernesto Hoelck, a German sympathizer.[17] It wasn't until Brazil entered the war in 1942 that all vestiges of Axis control had disappeared.

In retrospect, the removal of Axis airlines from Brazil was a long, arduous task which with persistence was finally accomplished. The U.S. managed this in time to prevent a serious danger by acting against a potential vice real threat,

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15. Lawrence Duggan, The Americas: The Search for Hemisphere Security, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1949), p. 85.

16. "Dynamite in South America," The New York Times Magazine, September 7, 1942, p. 96.

17. Ibid., p. 96.

relations as common environmental policy factor has served [illegible] for [illegible].[15]

Something which seems to be [illegible] in [illegible] of the Arab Spring[illegible] is [illegible]. The [illegible] positive analysis an [illegible] in [illegible] in the [illegible] in [illegible] in July, 2011, [illegible] not [illegible] placed in the [illegible] of the [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] for [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. Normally, the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

since the number of personnel, facilities and equipment were not of a magnitude to constitute a serious menace.

FOREIGN ELEMENTS IN THE POPULATION

In examining the problem of foreign elements in the population in Brazil, the threat posed can be analyzed from two viewpoints: the first being that they constituted a real danger and the second that they/the danger was exaggerated, with the truth probably somewhere in between. The United States adopted the view that constituted a danger. All measures were directed toward reducing the danger to a level acceptable to both North American and Brazilian societies.

When the North Americans looked southward, they saw subversion being conducted on a gigantic scale through radio broadcasts, Fascist propaganda bureaus subsidizing Latin American newspapers, pressures being exerted on Axis nationals to work for the extension of Fascist programs and agents creating political unrest through the establishment of Fascist movements. Even more important was the subversion being conducted through the transportation agencies, the economic penetration and indoctrination of army officers with Fascist ideas through military missions and study programs in Europe.[18]

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18. Duncan Aikman, The All-American Front, (New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 1941), pp. 239-240.

[illegible]

1E. [illegible]

The focal point of this activity was the large number of immigrants that had settled in Brazil, especially those that had recently arrived. The major sources of immigration since 1884 were as follows:

Portuguese	1,394,156	30.3%
Spanish	595,022	12.9%
Italians	1,502,958	32.6%
Germans	222,951	4.9%
Japanese	180,000	3.9%

If the number of descendents is considered, the total population involved reaches a figure of approximately twelve million. Subtracting those of Portuguese parentage, the remaining figure is in the vicinity of seven million, a fifth of the total population.[19] However, these figures are deceiving in that the Portuguese, Spanish and Italians were readily assimilated into Brazilian society as a result of a common cultural and social background. The languages proved to be no barrier to the assimilation of the Portuguese and the Italians as they are practically interchangeable.

The recent arrivals from Spain (post Franco) and the Italians subjected to the "glories of Fascism" were, for the most part, pro-axis, but the numbers involved were relatively small.

The Germans on the other hand were not easily assimilated for several reasons. Upon arrival in Brazil, they clustered in

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19. Bailey W. Diffie, "Some Foreign Influences in Contemporary Brazilian Politics," The Hispanic American Historical Review, August, 1940, p. 402.

small communities in the rural areas on land concessions granted by the Brazilian government.[20] This was possible initially, as Brazilian nationalism hadn't fully developed and the industrious Germans were viewed as welcome additions to the population. Furthermore, until 1933, they posed no threat. The different language, cultural background and social institutions also assisted in the prevention of the assimilation. The German language was retained while German newspapers, schools and sports societies continued to support the establishment and growth of these cultural enclaves. Close commercial contacts were maintained with the home country while the areas were over-run with disguised, official propagandists.[21]

Here again, as in the case of the Italians and Spanish, the pro-Axis elements were mainly in the ranks of the younger Germans. Many of the older Germans had not been exposed to the Third Reich while a substantial segment of the German immigrants had been Jews.[22] In all, probably about one-half of the Germans were anti-Nazi.

The Japanese, for most the reasons previously mentioned, were also unassimilated in Brazil. The great majority settled

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20. Bailey W. Diffie, "Some Foreign Influences in Contemporary Brazilian Politics," The Hispanic American Historical Review, August, 1940, p. 406.

21. Loewenstein, Brazil Under Vargas, pp. 158-159.

22. Diffie, "Some Foreign Influences in Contemporary Brazilian Politics,",p. 420.

in rural areas, with substantial numbers in the Amazon basin, as colonists under the supervision of corporations directed by the Japanese Government.[23]

There were indications that the movement of the Japanese into Brazil was deliberately motivated by strategic considerations of the Japanese planners. The Japanese Government had, for the fifteen years prior to Pearl Harbor, heavily subsidized Japanese immigration into Ecuador and Brazil, particularly along the Amazon River. This was the result of a Brazilian-Japanese agreement allotting two and one-half million acres in the Amazon basin for the establishment of quasi-independent, economic and political entities composed of Japanese colonists. Colonization, thus became a substitution for a lack of investment capital as a means of penetration.[24]

The area, being relatively inaccessible, made supervision of their activities rather difficult, but after severance of diplomatic relations with the Axis in 1942, the Brazilian Government moved to prevent action by the Japanese inimical to the state. Non-naturalized residents were arrested, settlements garrisoned with troops and fishing boats were limited in their movements. However, the threat

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23. Lowenstein, Brazil Under Vargas, p. 177.

24. Nathan Weyl, "Swastika Over Brazil," Nation, November 13, 1937

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23. [illegible]

24. [illegible]

of possible difficulties with this minority group probably precluded a declaration of war when Brazil acknowledged a state of belligerency with the Germans and Italians in August, 1942.[25]

The threat of these minority groups, in particular the Germans and the Italians, was recognized by Vargas when he took action to outlaw the Integralist movement as a legal means of political expression in 1938. Previous legislative action had been taken which was directed against the airlines, but they had continued to operate locally.

The Integralish movement, led by Plinio Salgado, was modeled after the European Fascist parties. It used the Fascist salute and members wore green shirts in deference to the predominant color in the Brazilian flag.[26]

They attempted a putsch in May 1938 which was countered when Vargas, moving with consumate skill and supported by the army, outlawed their activities. Although they were legally non-existent, their leaders went underground and there is little question that they were in operation right up to and during the war, but without effect. The interesting aspect of this period in 1938 was that Vargas had come to power with the support of the Integralist movement. He then turned on them, after they made excessive demands, when he realized they were not strong enough to achieve their

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25. Asia and the Americas, October 1943, p. 583.

26. Lowenstein, Brazil Under Vargas, pp. 32-33

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85. [illegible], [illegible] (1971), p. 180.
86. [illegible], [illegible], pp. 32-33

objectives. In addition, this action was directed against a possible internal rebellion and entailed severe repressive measures.

The measures against the German colonies, designed to Brazilianize them, although harsh in nature, were rather loosely enforced. The measures included the mandatory instruction in the Portuguese language in the rural schools, indoctrination in Brazilian history and government, limitations on the numbers of foreigners in one locality and foreign language publications had to have prior governmental approval.[27] Many more restrictions of a similar nature were promulgated with the same objective, that of removing the threat from the established groups of foreign elements in Brazil, before external influences could act in concert with them to subvert the existing government.

A review of the problem of minority groups and the measures taken, whether in response to the internal political situation or to external influence, reveals that by 1939 the efforts of the Germans and Italians to use their nationals in the promotion of their objectives in Brazil were a failure.[28] The political stability of the Vargas regime enabled him to maintain a complete control over

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27. Lowenstein, Brazil Under Vargas, pp. 189-190.

28. Diffy, "Some Foreign Influences in Contemporary Brazilian Politics," p. 428.

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subversive activities. This was recognized in Brazil by the minorities concerned and abroad at the seat of Fascist power. Vargas, in a speech on December 30, 1941, reputedly made a statement that "if my local Germans make trouble, I will eat them alive." [29] Nothing could be more illustrative of the confidence of the Vargas government to apply the necessary measures for preventing, simultaneously, an internal rebellion in conjunction with a military attack from abroad.

ECONOMIC PENETRATION

The Axis threat to the Western Hemisphere was recognized publicly by Franklin Delano Roosevelt in June, 1940. He announced that a program of cooperative economic action, by the American republics, was being projected in order that safeguards might be provided against Nazi economic aggression by means of regimented labor, monetary controls and barter trade.[30]

This public acknowledgement of the German economic threat in Latin America occurred at a time when the regime was at its zenith. France was conquered and Britain was on the defensive, with the prospects of overcoming the Axis threat exceedingly dim. Thereafter, the economic might of

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29. John Gunther, Inside Brazil, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1941), p. 387.

30. Whitney H. Shepardson and William O. Scroggs, The United States in World Affairs: An Account of American Foreign Relations, 1940 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1941), p. 83.

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America was to be employed in the struggle against the Axis as a subsidiary means of affecting the final outcome.

The German economic threat had been formulating for a lengthy period of time in Brazil, particularly during the 1930's. The open manifestations of their actions had been the establishment of the airlines throughout the area, attention to which had been drawn by their military significance. Almost as dangerous, but seemingly innocuous in character, were the other methods of economic warfare utilized by Germany to enhance its economic strength.

These measures consisted of the standard pattern of foreign investment, loans, the employment of nationals in managerial positions, the acquisition of resources, and trade agreements, all of which become techniques of economic warfare when the intent is to exercise control over a country.[31]

In Brazil, the Germans had emphasized investment in manufacturing, agriculture and commerce while the United States had been interested in public utilities and the coffee trade.[32] The American interest in these investment areas proved to be a hindrance in later United States-Brazilian relations due to the extreme importance of coffee

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31. George A. Lincoln, Economics of National Security, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1954), p. 531.

32. Brazil 1940-1941: An Economic, Social and Geographical Survey, (Rio de Janeiro: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1941), p. 360.

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in Brazil's trade and the xenophic reaction to foreign investment in public utilities, whereas the German pattern of investment had several beneficial effects.

The primary benefit accruing to Germany was the fact that its strength, economically speaking, was concentrated in the control of distribution and export-import firms such as that of Theodor Wille, the number one coffee exporter.[33] Moreover, powerful industrial and commercial houses had been established, examples of which were the following:

Chimica Bayer-Brazilian subsidiary of I. G. Farber industries

Chimica "Merck" Brazil - A subsidiary of E.A.G. Merck of Germany

Cia Constructora Nacional

Frabrica Gunther Wagner

These firms were engaged in making large financial contributions to the German embassy and front groups for espionage and propaganda. In addition, in promotion of German business interest, they supported the formation of "interesses criados"(vested interests) that exerted formidable political and economic pressures on the Brazilian Government.[34]

German commercial policy assisted in the penetration of Brazil through the use, not only of higher prices for

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33. Fortune, November, 1942.

34. The New York Times, January 12, 1945.

in Smith's [illegible] conditions to foster investment in public utilities, among the German orders of Germanos [illegible] [illegible] crisis.

Therefore [illegible] [illegible] the fact that the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Brazilian exports, but by bilateral barter agreements (in effect a free exchange market), far better credit terms, the Aski-mark system (purchase of goods for marks which could be spent only in Germany) and colossal orders for cacao and cotton.[35] Moreover, the fact that Germany had lost her colonies in World War I was an advantage in that she was no longer considered an imperialist nation as was the United States.[36]

As a result of the above, total trade with the Axis nations had increased from 1929-1932 to 1935-1937 at an annual rate of approximately eighty-eight million dollars.[37] Brazil, being an area of primary interest, was a participant in the trade increase, importing hardware, tools, cutlery, machinery, railroad cars, chemicals, wool yarn and cheap gadgets under barter agreements for coffee, cotton, tobacco, cacao and rubber. Although profitable in the long-run, she was compelled to take whatever Germany wanted to sell at Germany's price.[38]

The trade pattern with the Axis wasn't shifted until the period 1939-1940 when the war in Europe began to inhibit Germany's ability to provide goods to Brazil in

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35. Fortune, 1939, p. 151.

36. Donald Marquand Dozer, Are We Good Neighbors? (Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida Press, 1959), p. 49.

37. Ibid., p. 49.

38. Life, May 22, 1939.

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exchange for her imports. In the years prior to 1939, the United States had been importing 34-36 percent of Brazil's total exports, while supplying imports of from 23-33 percent. Germany had been importing 17-19 percent of Brazil's exports and supplying 19-24 percent of her imports during the same period, thereby holding second place in the trade of Brazil as both a market and a supplier. By 1940, Germany, as a result of the war, had become the seventh most important supplier and market for Brazil.[39] However, the total trade figures while reflecting a reduction in trade, do not indicate the importance of this trade to Germany in support of her war effort, as strategic materials were still being imported.

The following figures are illustrative of not only the reduction in total trade, but the continued reliance of Germany on Brazil as a source of supply.

Brazilian Exports to Germany	1939	1940
Lard	92.93%	78.26%
Rubber	25.78%	19.96%
Wool	94.32%	7.43%

A similar comparison utilizing some strategic products such as mica, manganese, industrial diamonds, and quartz crystal clearly indicate the extent of the replacement of Germany by the United States as a market for Brazil.[40]

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39. Brazil, 1940-1941, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pp. 338-339.

40. Ibid., pp. 338-339.

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In 1941, Germany, Italy and Japan were still exerting efforts in Brazil to obtain supplies for durrent and reserve use, even to the extent of using blockade runners for quartz crystal, and mica. Industrial diamonds were still being transported by L.A.T.I., at enormous cost, to maintain the capability of the machine tool industry. The German commercial houses which had entered into contracts involving penalty clauses for non-performance, were still paying fees for non-delivery and concluding contracts in spite of the British blockade. Moreover, German commercial organizations were maintained intact.[41] The Japanese were still purchasing strategic materials for stockpiling and maintaining their highly organized mining and purchasing facilities for quartz, tantalite and mica.[42]

It wasn't until the submarine attacks on Brazilian shipping, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the economic strangulation of Brazil due to the loss of her European markets, that the enormity of the Axis threat was fully acknowledged and complete cooperation in the economic sphere was undertaken to counteract it.[43]

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41. Dozer, Are We Good Neighbors, p. 73.

42. New York Times, January 12, 1945.

43. "Good Neighbors in the War and After," Foreign Affairs, April 1943, p. 524.

In 1943, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Chapter III

U.S.-BRAZILIAN RESPONSE TO THE THREAT

MILITARY MEASURES

The external Axis threat to Brazil and therefore to the North American continent, was recognized in the first instance by the United States which initiated steps to negate the threat on a broad front. These efforts included diplomatic, military, economic and political measures, the efficacy of which can be attested to by the fact that both Brazilian and U.S. national objectives were achieved which were designed to supplant all Axis activities in Brazil with similar U.S. programs. Additionally, programs in which the Axis had not been active, for example industrial/commerical development by Brazilians, promotion of health/sanitation programs, and the modernization of the Brazilian armed forces were supported by the United States. The Brazilian response, initially slow due to the internal political situation, rapidly gathered momentum until the entrance of Brazil into the war.

In Brazil, the struggle between the democratic forces and Fascist elements developed in favor of the supporters of democracy, when it was reported on June 18, 1941, that Brazil had banned the exportation of important defense materials. Other developments such as the replacement of Adhemar de Barros, the Federal Interventor for Sao Paulo, by Fernando Costa, whose first public statement emphasized

the need for closer U.S.-Brazilian economic relations, and the refusal of the government to allow L.A.T.I. to station a plane tender near Fernando de Naronha Island, seemed to signify a definite trend toward the support of the United States.[1] U.S. aircraft had been ferried to the British in the Middle East via Brazil. The Brazilian policy was still not clear as Condor had opened a new route in Maranhao on the northern coast on June 21.[2]

Early in December, it was announced that this welcome development represented the culmination of efforts by President Roosevelt to provide assistance to the British in the most expeditious manner. He had requested additional appropriations in May to further strengthen hemispheric defense and was granted $1,350,000,000 of which $200,000,000 was an emergency fund.[3] This fund, not only provided $8,000,000 to Brazil to assist in purchasing equipment of the expropriated German and Italian airlines, but it also financed the airport development program under the aegis of Pan-American Airways.[4]

The airport development program went far beyond a ferrying service as it envisioned the development of at

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1. Current History, September 1941, p. 82.

2. Ibid., p. 82.

3. Conn and Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisperic Defense, Vol. 1, The Western Hemisphere, p. 41.

4. Lawrence Duggan, The Americas: The Search for Hemisphere Security, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1949), p. 85.

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1. [illegible], [illegible] 1981, p. [illegible].

2. [illegible], p. [illegible].

3. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], p. [illegible].

4. [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], 1981, p. [illegible].

least a dozen land-sea airports on the hump of Brazil which were to become major sites for operations in the area. The project had been in operation for at least a year with work rushing toward completion on half of the airfields. Work was being performed by hand labor at a pay scale of about thirty cents a day.[5]

"Victory Corridor"

Pan-American was responsible for the provision of ferry crews for the 1610 mile trip across the South Atlantic from Natal to Bathhurst. Flights to Africa had been made since October by both Pan-American and lend-lease transports, heavily overloaded and carrying extra gas tanks in their cabins to extend their range to twelve hours for the extra mileage involved in a trans-Atlantic crossing.[6] Brazil being officially neutral, the flights were disguised as a commercial operation, but the crews were augmented with "retired army personnel."[7]

These flights via the "victory corridor" were of inestimable value in support of the war efforts as they made possible the rebuilding of the British Eighth Army, the later reinforcement of U.S. forces in the Philippines and Java, and the emergency supply of items to India/China.[8]

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5. Life Magazine, December 15, 1941.
6. Ibid., p. 96.
7. "Brazil: The New Ally," Fortune, November 1942, p. 107.
8. Ibid., p. 107.

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Resolution of the Problem of Brazilian Bases

Perhaps, the most exasperating problem facing the United States in its relations with Brazil was the problem concerning the entrance of United States forces into Brazilian territory for the maintenance and protection of the vital bases on the Brazilian hump. Brazil was perfectly willing to cooperate with the United States in a covert manner as long as there was no immediate threat, and the manifestations of the cooperation wouldn't produce an unfavorable reaction on the internal political situation.

The United States, cognizant of the Brazilian sensitivities, had to develop plans for the introduction of forces into Brazil in a rather devious manner. Several approaches were suggested, among which were plans for the participation of United States army troops in Brazilian maneuvers in northeastern Brazil and the proposal for the use of Brazilian troops in Dutch Guiana/Azores, which would lead to an exchange of Brazilian-American defense forces. An additional plan was introduced by a colonel which involved the use of the United States Navy as a spearhead. First, the Navy would request permission to use the base at Natal for patrol planes; the Navy would request permission for assistance by B-17 type aircraft to assist in the patrol work; Marine guards would be provided for the aircraft and ultimately, army guards would

be requested to replace those of the Marine Corps.[9]

Prior to the initiation of open hostilities against Brazil by Germany, all the planning produced no solution to the introduction of U.S. forces except for some Marine units to guard the airfields at Natal, Recife, and Belem shortly before Pearl Harbor.[10]

As the war progressed and Brazil became a participant, the problem of U.S. forces in Brazil resolved itself as the internal political situation was no longer a concern. While the forces were not welcomed without some hesitation or reservations, on the part of the Brazilians, eventually Americans of all services were established throughout the chain of bases with the army headquarters and command center located at Recife in November, 1942.[11]

Brazil, shortly after the Rio Conference in January, 1942, began to embark on measures designed to ensure the safety of the bases. Air raid precautions were placed in effect in the coastal cities, conscripts tours were lengthened, garrisons on the coast were strengthened and General Estevao Leito de Carvalho was placed in command on the bulge.[12] This was considered a definite plus factor as he had severely repressed Axis activity in the south.

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9. Conn and Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, pp. 288-289.

10. Ibid., p. 304.

11. Ibid,, p. 325.

12. David H. Popper, "Hemispheric Solidarity in the War Crisis," Foreign Policy Reports, May 15, 1942.

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Fernando de Naronha was declared federal territory and plans were made to fortify it.

The Navy began to operate land based patrol aircraft from the bases at Natal and Recife in April, 1942. Arrangements were completed, concurrently, to integrate Brazilian Air Force (F.A.B.) operations with those of the U.S. Navy which enhanced the protective network for the bases.[13] Secretary of the Navy Knox visited the three most important bases. Natal, Recife and Belem, in October, 1942, stressed how well they were equipped and emphasized the all-out U.S.-Brazilian cooperation.[14]

In November, 1942, with the launching of the North-African offensive, the apprehension over the security of the bases was removed thereby enabling closer cooperation between the Brazilians and Americans so necessary to continue the support of the common effort against the Axis. The results of this cooperation enabled the U. S. to provide for the maintainance of 165,000 troops in Brazil before the end of the war.[15]

Military Assistance

One important aspect of the military cooperation, prior to and during the war, consisted of the arming of Brazil, not

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13. Conn and Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, p. 327.

14. The New York Times, October 10, 1942.

15. Donald Marquard Dozer, Are We Good Neighbors? (Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida Press, 1959), p. 122.

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only for hemispheric defense, but for participation in the overseas fighting. When the supplies of equipment and arms on order from Germany were not forthcoming in 1939, the Brazilians turned to the United States as an alternate source of supply. Existing legislation and policy were believed to prohibit the sale of arms to Latin America, but at President Roosevelt's behest, a joint resolution (Pittman Resolution), was passed and adopted in June, 1940 which allowed the War Department to sell coast defense and anti-aircraft guns and ammunition to the American Republics.[16] A decision by the Judge Advocate General to the effect that an act of June 5, 1920, authorizing the sale of surplus equipment to foreign buyers, provided a method for the satisfaction of the desire of the Brazilians to procure modern arms besides coastal defense weapons.[17]

However, in spite of the legislation permitting the sales, policy had been that there would be no introduction of offensive type weapons in Latin America. This was changed quite by accident when President Roosevelt without consultation with the State or War Departments consented to provide some arms to Haiti.[18] Nevertheless, at the time

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16. Conn and Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, p. 209.

17. Ibid., p. 209.

18. Ibid., p. 210.

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36. [illegible], p. [illegible].

37. [illegible], p. [illegible].

38. [illegible], p. [illegible].

weapons were unavailable in the quantities desired due to the buildup of our own forces and the supply of Britain.

In June 1940, Brazil submitted a request for a broad array of arms in the total amount of $180,000,000. In response to the request, the President approved a policy statement indicating that Brazil would be armed so as to defend herself against external attack by the Axis from neighboring states or overseas and to maintain internal order. The arms would be provided at a cost that she could pay, military assistance in the form of military personnel for training would be provided and the financial arrangements encompassed in the sale would be made on the basis of accepting the loss as charge against our national defense.[19] Still, the deteriorating military situation precluded the sending of more than token amounts of arms to Brazil.

President Roosevelt announced his plan for Lend-Lease in December 1940 at a press conference. The act, passed in March 1941, was designed to supply the requested munitions on the basis of need and United States ability to supply them.[20] For Brazil to participate in the Lend-Lease program, the President had to certify that her

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19. Conn and Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, p. 213.

20. Mark Skinner Watson, Chief of Staff: Pre-War Plans and Operations, (Vol. 1, The War Department, The United States Army in World War Two, 6 Vols. in process., Washington, D.C., Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1950), p. 368.

defense was vital to the defense of the United States. This was done on April 23, 1941.[21] After submission of her arms requirements, Brazil was declared eligible for Lend-Lease aid and an agreement was signed on March 3, 1942.[22]

Under the Lend-Lease program, Brazil received military equipment in the amount of $347,944,000 of a total allotted for Latin America of $475,000,000.[23] This amounted to approximately ten times the amount furnished to Mexico who also provided forces for actual combat against the Axis (air squadron).

Included in the shipments were machine tools for use by the Brazilian naval shipyards which were only obtained after much consultation and it was established that this was in the U.S. national interest.[24] The difficulty in procuring these machine tools was a reflection of the desire to withhold the means of providing a capacity for war production from the American republics which could be used after the war was over. Brazil, playing a large role in the fight against the Axis received offensive weapons,

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21. Conn and Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, p. 221.

22. Leland M. Goodrich and Marie J. Carroll, ed., Documents On American Foreign Relations, (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1944), p. 216.

23. Dozer, Are We Good Neighbors? p. 124.

24. Conn and Fairchild, p. 228.

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but only because of that role. In retrospect, the policy of arms supply to Brazil, as with the remainder of Latin America during the war, was exceedingly cautious.

Army aid to Latin America amounted to $324,000,000 of which Brazil received 71 percent. In addition, naval equipment and services increased the total to the aforementioned $347,044,000.[25] If the total Lend-Lease program of the United States is taken into account, then Brazil received about three-quarters of one percent which was a small price to pay for the services rendered.

The equipment provided to Brazil by the army was composed of munitions, coastal defense guns, tanks, trucks and enough arms to equip one-half of a division used to train the Brazilian Expeditionary Force.

Army aircraft deliveries were in excess of 2,000 with more than sixty percent going to Brazil and Mexico as both participated in overseas air action.[26] The initial deliveries were of training and transport type aircraft with tactical fighters delivered later.

In August, 1942, it was reported that a mass flight of forty-four U.S. planes had been flown to Brazil to replace the Focke-Wulf trainers then in use. The flight

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25. Conn and Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, p. 236.

26. Ibid., p. 227.

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25. [illegible] <u>[illegible]</u>.

26. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 67.

was led by a Brazilian major and was composed of six flight groups of fifty-eight Brazilian officers/men. Both PT-19 basic trainers and P-24 four-place transports were involved in the 9,000 mile trip.[27]

In order to further assist the Brazilian Air Force, arrangements were completed for the manufacture under license by the Fairchild Engine and Aircraft Corporation of the aircraft being transferred.[28]

Further assistance was provided by the training of Brazilian pilots in the United States by U.S. veteran pilots of the First Air Force at bases such as that at Suffolk, Long Island which provided advanced aerial combat instruction.[29]

The U.S. Navy also transferred naval aircraft to Brazil (Vega Ventura Bombers) to be used as part of the anti-submarine patrol force.

To supplement the meager Brazilian Navy, the following naval vessels were transferred to Brazil under Lend-Lease: eight Cannon class destroyer escorts (DE), eight patrol craft (DC), one transport, President Monroe, (AP), and two yard craft for a total of nineteen.[30]

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27. The New York Times, August 24, 1942.

28. Ibid., p. 5.

29. Ralph Salazar, "Prelude to Battle," Inter-American, December 1944, p. 22.

30. Samuel Elliot Morrison, Supplement and General Index (Vol. 15, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, 15 Vols., Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1962), p. 115.

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Considering the realities of the military confrontation with the Axis throughout the world and the lead time inherent in any tooling process for industrial production during war time, the record with regard to military assistance to Brazil in the form of equipment, munitions, and arms was a remarkable example of cooperation. Admittedly, the benefits derived as a result of the program were mutual, but that doesn't detract from the fact that the assistance was offered in the spirit of a Good Neighbor working in partnership for the maintenance of the security of the Western Hemisphere.

Brazilian Armed Forces

The Brazilian Armed forces, at the commencement of World War Two, were the second most powerful in South America; the forces of Argentina occupying first place. However, ranking against the other American Republics doesn't reveal the true strength of Brazil's forces as this was a war in which the most powerful fighting machines in history were engaged.

The Brazilian Navy was composed of:

Two battleships-(Minas Gerais-19,2000 tons, twelve inch guns and German armor and the Sao Paulo, both approximately thirty-three years old.) They had been rebuilt and modernized in 1939 and 1940.

Two cruisers -(Bahia and the Rio Grande De Sul-3,150 tons, built in 1909 and refitted in 1925-1926.)

Ten destroyers - (Built and under construction.)

Six torpedo boats

Four submarines

Eight minelayers

Two River gunboats

Two Minesweepers

Three River monitors

Various Auxilary Vessels

The air force was composed of three regiments of thirty-five hundred men. It had been recently expanded and many of the pilots were in training in the United States.[31]

The army was composed of one hundred thousand regular troops with an estimated three hundred thousand trained reserves.[32]

The force was sufficient for the maintenance of internal order, but totally insufficient for the waging of modern war overseas or defense against external attack. This was recognized by the Vargas regime by the initiation of orders for equipment from Germany and thence, from the United States.

As the war drew closer, President Vargas issued a decree calling up the reserves, expediting enlistments and authorizing the War Minister, General Eurico G. Dutra to

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31. The New York Times, August 23, 1942.

32. Fortune, November, 1942.

drastically increase the effective armed strength of Brazil.[33] Brazilian air force reserve officers were ordered to active service and 10,000 candidates were certified as available for flight training.[34] As a result, when war was declared, the armed forces were in a position to accept and utilize the military assistance provided by the United States.

ECONOMIC MEASURES

Commencement of Wartime Economic Cooperation

The Brazilian Foreign Minister, Osvaldo Aranha, in 1939, commenting on a new trade treaty negotiated with the United States whereby Brazil was to receive $120,000,000 in gold for the purchase of capital goods in return for the resumption of interest payments on American money invested in bonds, stated: "We wish to open the door to Brazil, but we insist on keeping the key in our own hands." This exemplifies the cautious approach to economic transactions with the United States just prior to the war.

However, the advent of World War Two and Brazil's involvement forced her, in effect, to almost completely rely on the United States economically by engaging in a series of joint ventures which were designed to maintain the stability of the internal economy and hopefully to provide the basis for continued growth after the war.[35]

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33. The New York Times, April 9, 1942.

34. The New York Times, May 10, 1942.

35. Life, May 22, 1939.

The commencement of the economic cooperation can be dated for all practical purposes with the pledge by President Roosevelt in April, 1939, that the United States would provide economic support to resist Axis economic pressure. In accordance with this pledge, Sumner Welles at the Panama meeting in September, 1939, announced that we would expand our shipping services and assist financially in developing their productive facilities. The establishment of the Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee in Washington composed of economic experts of the American republics was therefore agreed upon by the delegates.[36] Hence, even before the war had come to the hemisphere, some action in the economic realm had been undertaken.

Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs

As the war progressed, the economic difficulties encountered in Latin America led to the establishment, again at the suggestion of President Roosevelt, of the organization which was later to become the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA) headed by Nelson A. Rockefeller, in August, 1940. The purpose of the coordinator and his staff was to ensure prompt action in response to economic problems generated by the war in the government departments and war agencies. It also

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36. Bozer, Are We Good Neighbors? p. 71.

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would serve as a means of direct access to the White House as needed.[37] Its most important activity until mid 1941 was the compilation of the "blacklist" which was designed to prevent trading by American firms with those businesses conducting trade with the Axis.

An executive order later broadened the scope of the CIAA so that its functions finally included all activities not under the State, War or Navy Departments.[38]

The basic motivation for the establishment of this activity was the necessity of promoting hemispheric defense in areas other than military, for example commercial and cultural programs.

In the execution of this policy, a public works program including housing and sanitation projects was undertaken in Northeastern Brazil, after consultation with the Army, which designated it a strategic area. In addition, it established a separate organization, the Institute of Inter-American Affairs which undertook sanitation and public health measures throughout Latin America, the greater part of it in the same area.[39]

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37. U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Post World War II Political Developments in Latin America, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. Senate Rept. No. 1, (Washington, 1959), p. 3.

38. Conn and Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, p. 106.

39. Ibid., p. 107.

In the economic field, it worked to bolster the Latin American economies and to preclude purchases of raw materials by the Axis. In these fields, it was an unqualified success, from the American viewpoint, but parenthetically, it was an apparent failure in its cultural and propaganda activities. Its propaganda continually emphasized the military aspects of the U.S.-Brazilian cooperation and the strength of the United States which tended to create resentment. Its cultural programs were all embracing, but lacking in real depth. Foreign Minister Aranha who received most of the missions, experts and investigators wryly commented, "One more good-will mission and Brazil will declare war on the U.S.A."[40] Nevertheless, the bonds forged from its economic activities proved strong enough to withstand the strains imposed by the war.

Preclusive Purchases of Strategic Materials

A quip was current in Brazil in the forties to the effect that Columbus discovered America in 1492 and America discovered Brazil in 1942. This obviously had reference to the attention that was focused on that country by the United States due to the joint economic agreements resulting from the Rio Conference.

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40. "The Coming of Brazil," Fortune, October, 1941.

The United States realized that enlisting the full support of the Brazilians would necessarily entail a multitude of problems. In order to obtain the strategic materials we required and to stabilize the Brazilian economy, technical personnel, machinery manufactured in the U.S., rails, port facilities and ships would have to be provided to Brazil. For this reason, seven of nine principal advisors to Sumner Welles at Rio were economic advisors.[41] Moreover, since we expected enormous deliveries from Brazil, it was imperative that her economic life not be stifled.

Full economic cooperation was pledged at the Rio Conference with the United States agreeing to provide consumer goods to the American republics on the same basis as our own civilians in return for their supplying maximum amounts of strategic materials. Basically, the United States endeavoured to adhere to the agreement, although shipping and consumer goods shortages prevented the carrying out of the full intent of the pledge. Consumer goods shipments for the period 1939-1944 almost doubled rising from $543,000,000 to $1,034,000,000, not taking into account price rises due to inflation.[42]

The idea of purchasing Latin American raw materials, to assist them and to preclude Axis purchase, originated

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41. "The Good Neighbors and the War," New Republic, January 26, 1942.

42. Lawrence Duggan, The Americas: The Search for Hemisphere Security, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1949), p. 97.

The idea of a [illegible] [illegible] indicating the fact [illegible] a [illegible] of [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

in the Good Neighbor policy of President Roosevelt in 1936 at Montivedeo. By 1939, the idea had gained to the extent that the Metals Reserve Corporation was established to procure and ship to the U.S. diamonds, mica, quartz crystal and manganese.[43] In 1940, President Roosevelt requested that priority for purchase of these materials be given to Latin American nations.[44]

In May 1941, a United States-Brazilian agreement was arranged by the Foreign Affairs Minister Oswaldo Aranha and U.S. Ambassador, Jefferson Caffery through a series of notes which granted the United States a two year exclusive purchasing right to all Brazilian strategic materials. All materials not purchased by private companies would be taken by the Metal Reserve and Rubber Reserve Corporations at prices agreed upon in advance.[45]

Joan Raushenbush referred to strategic materials as the "sinews of war" pointing out that mica was essential for electrical equipment, antimony for batteries/chemicals, tungsten for high speed tool steel and quartz crystals for radios.[46] Large amounts of zirconium, used in blasting caps, and beryllium for alloy steels, urgently needed,

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43. The New York Times, February 16, 1943.

44. Dozer, Are We Good Neighbors? p. 77.

45. Pan-American Union Bulletin, November, 1941, p. 670.

46. Joan Raushenbush, "Look At Latin America," (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1940), p. 56.

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43. The Jan. 1969 issue, February 20, 1969.

44. Jones, Are we good neighbors? p. 37.

45. Pro-American Labor Leaders, Monday, June, 1970.

46. Juan Bosch-Guzman, "Life in Latin America," The Washington Foreign Policy Association, (1963), p. 94.

were also supplied by Brazil.[47] Before the war, these purchases had been made for political reasons, but after the war had begun, Brazil became the only source of supply.

The aforementioned measures substantially aided the global military effort of the allies as Brazil, one of the most important supply centers, was virtually immune to Axis interference as the war progressed.

Industrial Development and Agricultural Diversification

Ancillary too, but exceedingly important in the economic sphere was the stimulation of the development of Brazilian industry and agricultural production. Joao Alberto Lins de Barros, the most powerful man next to Vargas, occupied the post of Economic Coordinator, a position similar to that held by Nelson A. Rockefeller.[48] As economic coordinator, his function was to expedite the development, procurement and shipment of all materials to the United States. To this end, he formulated specific plans to increase the supply of mica and quartz crystals, boost rubber production in the Amazon to 120,000-150,000 tons within two years, exploit oil reserves to supply allied ships, and increase steel plate/bauxite shipments.[49]

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47. Prepared by the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, Our American Neighbors, (Washington, D.C., Public Affairs Press, 1945), pp. 54-55.

48. Fredria del Vellar, "Brazilian Dynamo," The Inter-American, April, 1943, p. 16.

49. The Inter-American, March, 1943, p. 42.

were also [illegible] [illegible],[47] [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

One of the most ambitious projects was that of expediting the increase in rubber production. As originally envisioned by Nelson Rockefeller and the Board of Economic Warfare, the rubber would be grown on a U.S. managed tropical empire in the Amazon. The Brazilian Finance Minister, Dr. Arthur de Souza commented that "They've forgotten how big the Amazon is and whose Amazon it is."[50]

Nevertheless, an agreement was arranged in March, 1942 under which the Brazilian Government recruited and transported thousands of workers to the Amazon basin to become rubber workers. The vanguard of the 80,000 assigned workers didn't leave for the Amazon until February, 1943. The expenses of the project were jointly financed by the Brazilians and United States as was the Amazon Valley Health project ($5,000,000) necessary to sustain the workers in the hostile environment.[51] Production of rubber increased to some extent, but never did reach the original target figures as the difficulties of collecting the product from trees growing wild were grossly underestimated.

The focal point for the industrial development of Brazil was the Volta Redonda iron and steel plant. Brazil had iron ore, manganese and limestone in Minas Gerais in

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50. "Brazil: The New Ally," Fortune, November, 1942.

51. Murkland, Current History, February, 1943, p. 523.

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50. "Revolt: The Ten Years," [illegible], November, 1969.

51. Hawkins, [illegible] [illegible], 1965, p. 203.

addition to coal in Santa Catarina. Only capital was lacking which was supplied by the Export-Import Bank to pay for furnances, coke ovens, and rails as part of the United States payment for the use of airstrips on the hump. Additionally, $14,000,000 in credit was granted to Brazil by the Export-Import Bank to pay for railroad construction to open up the Itaira iron mines.

Despite United States reluctance to embark on the venture, due to the lack of plant equipment, the project was a necessity in order that nationalist military officers, opposing the decision of Vargas, would concur in the use of Brazilian soil by foreign forces.[52] The increased production throughout the war and the surmounting of the geographical difficulties incurred in transporting coal 720 miles from Santa Catarina while bringing iron ore 100 miles from Itabira (the worlds largest high grade iron ore reserve), was proof of the industrial emancipation of Brazil.

Financial Measures

Financial measures in support of economic cooperation, in addition to loans and grants for development and public works projects, provided for stabilization of the Brazilian currency. The United States even went to the extent of

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52. John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin America, (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 167.

shipping Brazilian banknotes by air to Brazil to alleviate a currency shortage after a previous shipment had been sunk.[53]

Other measures to assist Brazil included the Inter-American Coffee Marketing Agreement designed to prevent competition and a price decline. The agreement divided the United States market among the exporting countries by quota with the American consumers paying higher prices to add to Brazilian income. Quotas were also imposed on imports to the U.S. from non-signatories along with appropriate measures to finance storage of surpluses in Brazil.[54] This agreement was a success from the Brazilian viewpoint and the cost to the U.S. was rather insignificant.

Shipping Measures

Shipping facilities presented another problem in the support of economic cooperation for as the war continued, foreign flag vessels were increasingly withdrawn from service. The United States tried to meet the shortage by diverting more vessels to trade with the Western Hemisphere, the utilization of priorities and the taking of Axis ships in American ports after commencement of the war. The number of U.S. flag vessels in intra-hemisphere trade doubled between June, 1939, and September, 1940.[55]

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53. Harry B. Murkland, "The Hispanic American Record," Current History, September, 1942, p. 242.

54. John DeWilde, "Wartime Economic Cooperation in the Americas," Foreign Policy Reports, February, 1942, p. 280.

55. Ibid., p. 244.

relative [illegible] to be [illegible] to activate a [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible].[53]

[illegible] to [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

In short, all of these measures; increasing U.S. purchases, extension of credit, promotion of industrial development and agricultural diversification in conjunction with the efforts to maintain hemisphere trade at a high level, served to unite the Brazilians and the United States in an area where the effects of the cooperation could be readily ascertained.

Cooke Mission

A large share of the credit for the achievement, to a high degree, of these measures can be attributed to the efforts of the Cooke Mission to Brazil in 1942. The basic objectives of the mission were outlined in a White House statement in September, 1942. They were as follows:

1. To increase Brazilian production of essential products, especially those formerly imported from the U.S. to save shipping space.

2. Convert Brazilian industry to the use of substitute raw materials, replacing supplies originally imported.

3. Maintain and improve transport facilities.

4. Lay the foundation for a long-range strengthening of Brazil's whole industrial economy.[56]

Morris L. Cooke, the head of the U.S. Technical Mission had been the former head of the Rural Electrification Administration and a consultant at the war production board.

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56. The New York Times, September 3, 1942.

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The work of the mission was basically to examine the whole Brazilian economy, determine the deficiencies and to make recommendations to correct them with a view toward strengthening the economy to sustain war production, and concurrently, to provide the basis for post-war economic growth.[57] The technical analysis conducted in pursuance of this work provided insight into the ways of lessening the impact of the war on the economy of Brazil which benefited both parties.

POLITICAL MEASURES

Measures Against Axis Agents and Property

When the war began, it was realized by all parties in the Hemisphere that the Good Neighbor Policy was going to undergo a crucial test. All previous planning, whether concerning the fifth column or economic warfare, could only become a reality through political confidence and agreement. This agreement was manifested by the establishment of the Emergency Advisory Committee on Political Defense and the recommendation to break diplomatic and economic relations with the Axis at the Rio Conference in January, 1942. Members were enjoined, by Resolution XVII to meet total political aggression by coordinated political defense.[58] The organization to supervise this

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57. Morris Llewellyn Cooke, Brazil on The March-A Study in International Cooperation, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1944), p. 13.

58. Karl Lowenstein, "Pan-Americanism in Action," Current History, November, 1943, p. 229.

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defense was the Emergency Committee on Political Defense created through the Pan-American Union.

The Committee was an inter-American body of seven members which convened at Montevideo along with liaison officers from the states not represented on the committee.[59] It kept a continuous watch over enemy propaganda, sabotage, and made practical recommendations for measures to be adopted to prevent Axis infiltration from abroad and control the fifth column at home. By November, 1943, it had recommended twenty-one measures that had been placed into legislation by all the states except Argentina. These measures provided for control of dangerous aliens, prevention of the abuse of citizenship, the control of clandestine travel across borders and the protection of ship and harbor facilities.[60]

The anti-Fascist drive started in Brazil without waiting for the resolutions at Rio for the curtailment of Axis activity. President Vargas took the first measures of reprisal against the Axis by amending the constitution to permit the seizure of Axis property in order to provide compensation for losses involved in ship sinkings. The 23,861 ton Italian liner, Conte Grande, taken over for the duration of the war was too large for intra-coastal trade and plans were in the offing to turn the ship over to

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59. Karl Lowenstein, "Pan-Americanism in Action," Current History, November, 1943, p. 230.

60. Ibid., p. 233.

[illegible]

the United States.[61]

Investigations of Axis nationalists clubs began immediately for evidence of seditious activity. The franchises of the German Transocean, Italian Stefani and Japanese Domei news agencies were cancelled, sports clubs were closed and all Axis nationals required to register. Residence couldn't be changed without approval and small arms had to be turned over to the police.[62]

The culmination, at Rio, of the long series of measures to control the Axis nationals in Brazil effectively protected the country from infiltration and was a large step in permitting the economic mobilization of the continent. Moreover, it set the pattern for the remainder of South America.

In the field of political defense, the results can only be considered a definite success in Brazil.

THE POLICY DECISION FOR WAR

An analysis of the Brazilian policy decision for war against the Axis reveals that the decision was dependent upon a multitude of factors, none of which were really significant, but in combination were sufficient to tip the scales in favor of the Allies. However, in the years

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61. The New York Times, January 23, 1942.

62. The New York Times, January 30, 1942.

the future trains.[61]

Investigations of this organization show some inconsistency in evidence of political activity. The Presidency of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, and Moscow's Gorbachev, Yuri Luzhkov, clearly view some signs of the old centralized structure to replace. Positions vary, to prepare citizens economical and small area that to be turned away to the nation.[62]

The substitution, or in, of the long-range or measures is material the only political, in Yeltsin effectively lacking of the system, for instance and was a large step in establishing the economic rationalization of the economy. However, it has the military for the remedies of years ago.

In the field of political change, the results can only be considered, indicate course, in vain.

The Yeltsin Solution for the

As analysis of the Russian policy realism for use against the only reveals that the institution are dependent upon a multitude of factors, some of which have yet to be identified, and to constitution some activities in the the equals in terms of the elite. However, in the near

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61. The New York Times, January 23, 1991.

62. The New York Times, January 10, 1991.

immediately prior to the announcement of the decision on August 22, 1942, even the most informed Latin American experts were in doubt as to which side Brazil would finally opt for, or if she would remain neutral in the conflict despite a growing proclivity toward rejection of the Fascist influence.

The enigma posed by Brazil in this regard was partially the result of the semi-Fascist regime in power in Brazil, the internal political situation with the dichotomy between the top level supporters of Vargas, the trend of external events and the incipient nationalism exemplified by the reaction of the Brazilians to the war declaration.

Late in 1940, Ambassador Caffery negotiated concessions for bases (army, navy and blimp) from Amapa in the north to Santa Cruz in the south. This would have seemed to indicate, under prevailing measurements for diplomatic success, that Brazil was going to line up with Allies, if the decision had to be made. But even to December 7, 1941, Vargas was still undecided, still playing a cautious hand and refusing to become committed.[63] By the Rio Conference in January, 1942, Vargas was still dubious about taking the final step, but assented in the

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63. Hubert Herring, A History of Latin American From Beginning to Present (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1961) p. 766.

immediately upon the announcement of the decision on August 24, 1961, when the most informed media commentators were in doubt as to which side Tunku would finally back. Or, if the world media looked to the conflict despite a genuine preoccupation, merely reflection of the national influence.

The actions taken by Tunku to rate Singapore and partially the remnants of the anti-Malaya national power in Malaya, the internal political alignment with the disorder, behind the top level commanders of Tunku, the issue of indirect rule and the limited defensive expenditure by the relation of the politicians to the development.

Late in 1961, addressing Dutch, regarding non-cooperation for Malaya (Malay, Malay and Dilem) Tunku began in the month to [illegible] in the south. This would have caused to initiate, under [illegible] for diplomatic [illegible], that [illegible] to [illegible] with [illegible]. If the decision had to be made. On [illegible] December 7, 1961, Tunku was [illegible] with [illegible] playing a [illegible] been [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible].[63] By the [illegible] in January, 1962, Tunku was still [illegible] about making the final [illegible], but [illegible] in the [illegible].

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63. [illegible] Harding, [illegible] of Lucian Pye in [illegible] Institutions in Transition (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1961) p. 166.

commitment to support the Allies. As events progressed during the months after Rio, it finally reached the point where the problem of whether or not to declare war could only be resolved in the affirmative.

The recognition of a state of belligerency and the events leading to it were almost an exact replay of the events as experienced by Brazil in World War I. Then, the war had been in its fourth year when Brazil joined on October 26, 1917. The United States had entered the war approximately six months earlier and the provocation was U-boat sinkings. The effective contributions consisted primarily of food supplies and a small naval force to patrol the Atlantic coast.

In 1942, the war was in its third year, the United States had entered eight months earlier and the provocation was the same, nineteen ships sunk by submarines.

The only divergence between the two period was that in 1917, Congress declared war, whereas in 1942, Vargas made the decision in the absence of a congress and received cabinet approval.[64]

The movement toward war, for Brazil, was relatively slow. For breaking off relations with the Axis in January, 1942, the Germans, in reprisal, sunk several Brazilian ships. On March 11, 1942, the fourth Brazilian

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64. "Hemispheric Unity for Allies Bolstered by Brazil at War," Newsweek, August 31, 1942.

ship (5,152 ton Gayru) was sunk with the loss of fifty-nine lives.[65] The next day, anti-German demostrations took place in Rio de Janeiro with the demonstrators surging down the Rua Do Ouvidor, the fifth avenue of the capital, wrecking German shops, burning books and shouting "Down with Hitler."[66]

On March 23, 1942, the Germans attacked the Brazilian ship, Tubate near Port Said for which an apology was issued.[67]

In the week immediately preceding the acknowledgement of war by Brazil, five shipswere sunk with the loss of 600 lives including those of 169 soldiers on an army transport.[68] This apparently was the breaking point,for the angry populace filled the streets of the major cities demanding war.

On August 21st, bonfires of Nazi flags were raging on the steps of the municipal theatre and seamen gathered on the palace lawn. Vargas in speaking to the assembled crowd stated: "The sea is a symbol of liberty and a nation that does not protect its sea is not worthy to live."[69]

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65. "Carioca Bonfire," Newsweek, March 23, 1942.

66. Ibid., p. 32.

67. The New York Times, August 24, 1942.

68. Life Magazine, September 7, 1942.

69. "Brazil: The New Ally," Fortune, November, 1942, p. 212.

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65. "Garbage Contains," Newsweek, March 23, 1970.

66. Ibid., p. 32.

67. The New York Times, March 24, 1970.

68. Life Magazine, September 7, 1964.

69. "Brazil: Out for Life," Economist, Commerce, 1969, p. 212.

A state of belligerence was recognized on August 22, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs explained, in deference to the proud tradition of Brazil in never declaring war on any nation. Italy was included as it was considered integrated with Germany.[70] Japan was not included because of the potential threat of the immigrants within the country and the desire not to endanger Chile with a long undefended coastline.[71]

It wasn't until President Vargas issued a decree on June 6, 1945 that Brazil actively became a belligerent against Japan.[72] By that time, it hardly mattered one way or the other insofar as the United States was concerned.

It appears that the final decision to enter the war was delayed an inordinate amount of time. The Brazilians were very slowly advancing toward the position of belligerence by executing what could be considered to be some very bellicose acts. As previously mentioned, President Vargas had wielded an extremely strong hand against the Axis minorities in the period preceding the war, even to the extent of disregarding constitutional guarantees. He broke off diplomatic relations in 1942,

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70. "Brazil: The New Ally," Fortune, November, 1942, p. 212.

71. The New York Times, August 23, 1942.

72. Leland M. Goodrich and Marie J. Carroll, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations: July, 1944 - June, 1945, (Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1947), p. 419.

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70. "Brazil: Ally for Ally," Fortune, November, 1942, p. 127.

71. The New York Times, March 23, 1942.

72. Lyford P. Edwards and Leslie A. Marfell, ed., Documents on Inter-American Relations, July, 1944 - June, 1945, (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1947), p. 415.

rounded up Axis nationals, strengthened air/naval patrols and provided facilities for the United States Ferry Command.

In May, 1942, mixed Brazilian/U.S. crews flying B-25 aircraft attacked several subs off the coast. The Brazilian crew reportedly sank a submarine (Axis) in the latter part of May.[73] The Government owned newspaper, in reference to the Brazilian campaign to wipe out the submarine menace, editorialized that sinking the submarines was not an act of war, but a legitimate defense against organized piracy.[74]

Why was there so much delay in making a commitment by Brazil? Several reasons can be suggested. Prior to the war, Brazil had conducted the greatest amount of its trade with Europe. When the war began, she was undergoing a rapid period of industrial development which depended upon the flow of equipment and supplies from European sources. It was natural that she would be reluctant to disrupt the normal trade channels for reliance on the United States which might prove to have disastrous economic repercussions once the war was over. Moreover, cultural ties were close with Europe.

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73. The New York Times, May 27, 1942.

74. Ibid., p. 3.

provided an area metaphor, experiment theory, metaphor and practical facilities for the future design theory development.

In 1960, Alone established the Fluid Dynamics Laboratory which was the only one of its kind. The Establishment were responsible for a important role in the latter work of Joy.[73] The developed wind tunnels, in reference to the Smithsonian complex to view the underwater model, additionally that similar the underwater was not so set of war, but a lightweight different equipment design.[74]

Joy was always so much doing in trying a consistent by Dwelly forward working and it experiment. Prior to the war, Dwelly was designed on the product manner of his issue with Joyce. Even the war began, and was accomplished a rapid growth of industrial development which depended upon the flow of materials and supplies from foreign countries. It was evident that the should be reduced to discover the natural area economic for problems on the British Devise which might serve by here industrial economic improvements cannot be no more. Joyce, certainly the same years with Dwelly.

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73. The New York Times, op. cit, 1960.

74. Ibid., p. 3.

The Axis military threat was evolving into a reality as the war in Europe continued, especially after the fall of France. Possible direct military action via North Africa appeared to be a reasonable expectation. Vargas knew that the Brazilian armed forces were of insufficient strength to cope with a direct external attack coinciding with internal armed rebellion.

The Brazilian military leaders exercised a great deal of influence over the policy decisions of the Vargas administration. Being trained and equipped by the Axis, impressed with their sudden victories and apparent omnipotence, they therefore tended to favor the Fascists. The Navy tended to be pro-United States, but exercised little in the way of influence.[75] They were therefore reluctant to act in concert with the U.S. and very likely convinced President Vargas to exercise caution until the outcome was no longer in doubt.

As the war progressed, German difficulties on the Russian front and British pressure in Africa acted to reduce the external military threat while the economic difficulties were resolved to Brazil's satisfaction by the action at Rio by the U.S. promise to lessen the shocks to the Brazilian economy as previously outlined.

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75. William H. Heasler, "Is South America Hedging on the War," Inter-American Quarterly, July, 1941, p. 9.

[illegible] Thailand's military budget was increasing into a reality and the air force [illegible], especially after the fall of Saigon. Thailand's armed military assists the Lao[illegible] airfield improvement to have [illegible] operation. Because that the Thailand armed forces were [illegible] adequately to cope with a direct military attack, cooperation with internal armed subversion.

[illegible] the Thailand military leaders [illegible] of influence over the [illegible] relationship. [illegible] equipped by the [illegible] impressed with their military [illegible] equipment [illegible] the Thailand [illegible] to serve the [illegible]. The Navy [illegible] in [illegible], but [illegible] little in the [illegible] of influence.[75] They were [illegible] reluctant to get in [illegible] with the U.S. And they likely [illegible] Thai [illegible] to [illegible] until the [illegible] was no longer in [illegible].

[illegible] Thailand's [illegible] in the war [illegible], [illegible] Thailand's [illegible] pressure in [illegible] to [illegible] the external military [illegible] while the economic difficulties were [illegible] in Thailand's [illegible] by the [illegible] of [illegible] by the U.S. [illegible] to [illegible] shocks to the Thailand [illegible] as previously [illegible].

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75. William S. Heaton, "Is [illegible] Thailand [illegible] on the [illegible]," Inter-[illegible], July, 1973, p. 9.

Concurrent with the reluctance to become involved, were several factors which served to promote an affirmative decision for a commitment to the Allies. Superficially, the submarine action led directly to the belligerency, but the sinkings had been going on for a period of months. Moreover, Brazilian nationals had been mistreated in German occupied France.[76]

The basic reasons for deciding on war were probably a combination of the following:

1. Close Brazilian-United States relations and cooperation had been fostered by Vargas despite the prevalence of ideological and practical differences.

2. Sumner Welles refused to react hastily to the charges made concerning Fascist tendencies in Brazil. This served to support a friendly relationship which in turn undoubtedly contributed to the notion held by Vargas that the long-range interests of Brazil were intertwined with those of the United States.

3. Once President Vargas became convinced of an Allied victory, the only logical step was to cement the political and economic cooperation with the strongest of all ties, military cooperation.[77]

4. The military leaders, although for the most part Pro-Fascist, were reluctant to wind up on the losing side. As the war progressed, the outcome was inevitable therefore forcing a change to support of the United States.

5. The people of Brazil supported a war declaration and manifested this support by anomic action throughout Brazil in protest against the shipping losses. I consider this to be a decisive factor.

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76. The New York Times, August 23, 1942.

77. Current History, Vol. 3, (September, 1942), p. 139.

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6. Nationalistic aspirations by the Brazilian military and the populace. If Brazil participated in the war on the side of the Allies, she would be in a position to participate in the peace as a victorious nation.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs had stated on August 1st, (before announcement of the decision for war) that Brazilian troops would be sent abroad if the need arose.[78] Brazilian troops abroad would increase enormously the prestige of Brazil throughout Latin America. In addition, the equipment would be supplied by the United States which would enable Brazil to become the leading military power on the South American continent. On the basis of a calculated risk, the expected gains from fighting the Axis were sure to far exceed the losses.

In summary, the policy decision to become an active military participant in World War Two was made only after a lengthy period of analysis during which the economic, military and political facets influencing the decision were considered. The decision, of course, was a political one made by an extremely competent politician with advantages that are still accruing to Brazil.

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78. Arthur P. Whitaker, ed., Inter-American Affairs, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943), p. 23.

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78. Lecture 2, [illegible], op., Inter-[illegible] [illegible], (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), p. 23.

Chapter IV

WARTIME MILITARY COOPERATION

Brazilian Expeditionary Force

The genesis of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force was probably a result of the correspondence between Roosevelt and Vargas in July, 1941. President Roosevelt was concerned with the Axis threat and invited Brazil to participate in a joint military endeavour to protect the hemisphere by occupying Dutch Guiana or the Azores if the need arose.[1] Although approved by Vargas, no action was forthcoming. A second proposal for sending Brazilian troops to Puerto Rico was never executed due to technical difficulties which caused the Brazilian and U. S. armies to oppose the plan.[2]

Soon after the war was commenced by Brazil against the Axis, the military leaders expressed a desire to become an active participant overseas, some even urging an independent action against Dakar in the Fall of 1942. This was vetoed by the State Department on the grounds that if Brazil sent forces overseas, other Latin American troops would have to be sent and they weren't trained.[3]

On January 20, 1943, a joint defense commission for Northeast Brazil recommended the establishment of a

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1. William L. Langer and Everett S. Gleason, The Undeclared War, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), p. 588.

2. Conn and Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, p. 289.

3. Ibid., p. 328.

Brazilian garrison force in that area, to consist of three infantry divisions, one armoured division, eleven anti-aircraft regiments and eleven coast artillery battalions. The recommendation was made in the knowledge that these forces were more than sufficient for defense, but the commission pointed out that they could probably be used overseas.[4]

On January 28, 1943, President Roosevelt stopped over in Brazil for a conference with President Vargas. The meeting was held aboard a U.S. destroyer in the harbor at Natal, after arrival of Roosevelt from Liberia by flying boat.[5] This meeting was the second F.D.R.-Vargas meeting on Brazilian soil, the first being in 1936 after the Buenos Aires Conference. Ostensibly, the meeting was held in order that F.D.R. could report the results of the Casablanca Conference to President Vargas and to affirm, that the threat to Brazil had been eliminated by the North African expedition. However, the joint statement released to the press was couched in general terms. The Presidents said that they were meeting to survey the future safety of the Americas, that the aim of the U.S. and Brazil was to make the ocean safe for all and that in unity there is strength.[6]

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4. Conn and Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, p. 327.

5. The New York Times, January 30, 1943.

6. Franklin Watts, ed., Voices of History 1943-1944, (New York: Grammercy Publishing Co., 1944), p. 18.

Dwelling neither upon the [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

The New York Times of January 30, 1943 reported that the evening meeting was spent considering the joint U.S.-Brazilian effort. It is likely that the B.E.F. was discussed at the meeting and a general outline of its employment overseas formulated.

In April, 1943, President Vargas and General Carvalho presented a plan for a four-division overseas force which was approved in principal by General Marshall. The plan as it developed envisioned that the Brazilian units would serve under the high command of the United States and follow our strategic direction.[7]

By now, the army was restive for overseas action and although reported fully armed with modern equipment, this was not the case. Utilization of the force overseas would have to depend upon the U.S. equipping it upon arrival in the overseas theatre of operations.

As the plans coalesced for the B.E.F., the Brazilian Minister of Air went to the U.S. to arrange for the training of 1,500 pilots and army recruiting was stepped up.[8] Brigadier General Eduardo Gomes returned from Africa after talks with Eisenhower and predicted that Brazilian soldiers, sailors and airmen would fight alongside the Allies in the

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7. Conn and Fairchild, The Framework of the Hemisphere Defense, p. 328.

8. Inter-American, August, 1943.

[illegible] Charles Cook plans on January 16, 1943 announced that the standard [illegible] combination for [illegible] U.S.-Canadian [illegible]. It is about [illegible] [illegible] discussed at the meeting and [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] On April 1, 1943, President [illegible] and Secretary Stimson announced a plan for a [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] was supposed to [illegible] [illegible]. The plan [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] every member [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

near future.[9]

The command of the F.E.F. was sought by the War Minister, General Gaspar Dutra. Its composition was not known, but was expected to include 120,000 troops.

While the army was making plans for the overseas expedition, the Navy and Air Force were in action. In the month of June, Brazilian fliers added two more subs to their total and the Navy reinforced by sub chasers, was doing an efficient job.[10]

By the end of 1943, and into 1944, the U.S. offensives in Europe and the Pacific were gaining momentum. The threat to South America had been eliminated and all the strategic materials we could use were flowing into the U.S. The net result was that the United States became content to stand on the Rio Agreements which didn't include overseas participation by Brazilian forces.[11]

The Brazilian troops had been training since August, 1943 and were about ready to move overseas. The final decision to commit the troops to the combat areas was

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9. Frederico del Villar, "Brazilian Air Chief," Inter-American, August, 1943, p. 9.

10. "Brazilians to Fight Abroad," Inter-American, June, 1943, pp. 4-5.

11. John C. Campbell and the Research Staff of the Council on Foreign Relations, The United States in World Affairs, 1945-1947, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 208.

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9. Freedom for Africa, "Speeches in Africa," Ibadan University Library, 1963, p. [illegible].

10. "Speeches to Plan [illegible]," [illegible], June, 1963, pp. [illegible].

11. John S. Kennedy and the Democratic Party in [illegible] Campaign Speeches, [illegible]. The Ohio State University Press, 1964.

unfoubtedl, influenced b, the British view of the B.E.F. which was expressed by Winston Churchill in a communication to the Foreign Secretary in May, 1944, and to a General Hollis for relay to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Churchill was firmly in support of the B.E.F. and said:

> "I am all for getting the Brazilian division into Italy as soon as possible. Every effort should be made, subject to battle exigencies, to bring this division into Italy. There should be no talk of a token force. The above also applies to the airsquadron."[12]

In July, 1944, the B.E.F. arrived in Naples, Italy whereupon they began to put the Good Neighbor Policy into practice by mixing with the United States troops encamped alongside. Arriving without their own rations, they settled for United States food and complained that it was terrible, which set them solid with the American G.I.'s[13]

An interesting note on their arrival was the insignia worn by the whole division which consisted of a snake interwined around U.S.-Brazilian flags and smoking a pipe. The insignia was adopted in response to the Nazi comment on Brazil's entry into the war that the day you see Brazilian troops in Europe, you'll see a cobra smoke a pipe.

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12. Winston S. Churchill, Closing the Ring: The Second World War, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1951), p. 708.

13. The New York Times, July 24, 1944.

[illegible]

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12. [illegible]

13. [illegible], 1966.

The Nazi derogation of Brazil thus became a symbol of honor.[14]

The Italian Premier sent a message to Vargas hailing the landing of the Brazilian troops in Italy. Lt. Col. Carroll D. Peeks, Public Relations Officer with B.E.F. said:

> "they are the swingingest, marchingest, most enthusiastic soldiers you can find anywhere. They certainly are showing good fighting material."[15]

The B.E.F., conceived with high hopes, knowing why they were in Italy, and eager for action were assigned to the Fifth Army of General Clark in the Tyrrhenian coastal area which had been relatively quiet during the immediately preceding period. However, it wasn't until September 15th that a combat team was moved into the line and it was the end of Autumn before the whole division was incorporated into the strategic pattern.[16] At this time, the Allied forces were situated on a line running from Pisa, through Florence and thence to a point just south of Rimini. The Brazilians were assigned to the job of holding the left flank of the Allied line which was in the area North of Pisa on the coast. Shortly thereafter, an offensive was mounted to breach the Gothic Line which had been established

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14. The New York Times, September 3, 1945.

15. The New York Times, July 25, 1944.

16. General of the Army, George C. Marshall, Third Report, The War Reports of Marshall, Arnold and King, Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1947), p. 173.

[illegible] the [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

by the Germans as a last ditch defensive position in Italy. Although the line was penetrated after three months of fighting, in December, 1944, the Fifth Army was forced to suspend plans for a drive on Bologna due to pressure on the western flank, (Brazil sector), and withdrawal of British units on the eastern flank to meet a political crisis in Greece.[17]

The action during the late winter was limited to small advances in the Bologna sector. No major changes were made until the launching of the spring offensive on April 9th. By April 25th, the war was over in Italy with the initiation of negotiations for surrender by the Germans which resulted in their capitulation on May 2, 1945.[18] The Brazilian Expeditionary Force returned to Brazil on July 19, 1945 to be welcomed by thousands of cheering home-front supporters.

The question arises as to just how effective the military role of the B.E.F. was in Italy, and whether or not the consensus regarding that role is indicative of the actual contributions to the Allied victory in the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations.

To answer these questions required that several

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17. General of the Army, George C. Marshall, Third Report, The War Reports of Marshall, Arnold and King, Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1947), p. 173.

18. Ibid., p. 176.

by Mr. Lemnos in a lack-luster [illegible] politics in [illegible]. Although the Jews had demonstrated their loyalty during the fighting, in December, 1948, the Jews were forced to surrender plans for a [illegible] to Britain by pressure on the Russian front. (Ibid., [illegible]) and statement of British notes on the [illegible] in such a political crisis in [illegible].[17]

The [illegible] during the Jews' [illegible] was [illegible] small average in the Britons [illegible]. In [illegible] were [illegible] with the [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. In April 1954, [illegible] was [illegible] in [illegible] the [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] necessary [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

aspects of the military cooperation be considered. For example, the strategy involved in Italy, the time element with reference, not to the arrival and departure of the B.E.F., but to significant military considerations during the interval in between. Perhaps the best approach is to examine some inconsistencies in the reporting of the role of the B.E.F. during the period under consideration.

Samuel Flagg Bemis in his book, A Diplomatic History of the United States comments concerning the B.E.F. as follows:

> "they engaged in heroic bombat on the Italian front, and captured an entire German division."[19]

The New York Times reported the incident in a similar manner:

> The German B.E.F. compelled a German division to surrender. The German 148th infantry division surrendered to the B.E.F. turning over 6,000 officers and men in addition to 1,000 vehicles of all types and 4,000 horses.[20]

Several discrepancies can be immediately noted. First and foremost, it is extemely unlikely that a division, even if of the same caliber as that of an opponents, can compel the surrender of an opposing division, particularly

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19. Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States. (4th Ed., New York: Holt Rhinehart and Winston, 1955), p. 778.

20. The New York Times, April 30, 1945.

aspects of the military revolution [illegible] problems. For example, the military revolution is giving the lie to [illegible] with politicians, and is [illegible] the importance of the [illegible], but to [illegible] military [illegible] under the impetus to [illegible]. [illegible] is [illegible] to [illegible] in the [illegible] of the [illegible]. [illegible] the [illegible] of the [illegible].

Samuel Finer [illegible] in his [illegible], [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

one on the defensive. It is generally accepted military doctrine that to achieve a victory, the offense must be conducted with a superiority of three-to-one whereas a successful defense can normally be successful if fought with a one-to-two inferiority.[21] In the aforementioned instance, the Germans were on the defensive and were superior to the B.E.F. as a military unit. The B.E.F. had arrived in Italy designated a trained unit, but examination of a report concerning their prior training and activities in the Italian campaign indicated that the training received was virtually useless, insofar as fighting a modern war was concerned.[22]

In addition, they had to receive additional combat training when they arrived in the theatre of operations. Moreover, they were initially assigned to a quiet area of the front, presumably because of the lack of training and combat readiness.

The Brazilians engaged in combat from the end of September until the beginning of May, a period of approximately seven months. Very little activity was undertaken during the late winter, so for all practical purposes, the total combat period was about four months. The

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21. R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, Military Heritage of America, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1956), p. 216.

22. South Atlantic, U. S. Army Forces, Historical Section, "Report of the 1st Infantry Division Brazilian Expeditionary Forces in the Italian Campaign from July 16, 1944 to the Cessation of Hostilities in May, 1945," 92 pages. Photostat On File in the Office of the Chief of Military History, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

casualties for the period May 1, 1944 (the B.E.F. didn't arrive until July 16, 1944) until April 4, 1945 were reported as 2,112 killed, wounded and missing.[23] Obviously casualties occurring in the naval war in the Atlantic were included.

An analysis of statistics concerning the killed, wounded and missing in World War Two and Korea revealed that the ratio for the three categories was fairly close and on the order of one fatality for every three wounded, with the missing ranging from an almost negligible amount to one missing combatant. This enables a rough approximation of the three categories included in the total figure reported for B.E.F. casualties as follows:

Killed, 500 - Wounded 1,500 - Missing, 112

Experience with wounded in World War Two demonstrated that about two to three percent of the wounded would eventually became casualties. Therefore, the total killed was probably in the vicinity of six hundred. American casualties for seven months in several divisions in the fighting before Rome during a <u>ten day period</u> were reported as:

2,400	infantry	- Third Division
1,300	"	- Thirty-fourth Division
3,000	"	- Thirty-sixth Division

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23. <u>The New York Times</u>, April 15, 1945.

quantities for the period 1 July 1944 to 1 [illegible], [illegible] entry until 30 June 1944) until 4 July 1944 were reported as killed, wounded and missing.[53] Obviously meaningful comparison is the total number killed only is indicated.

An analysis of statistics concerning the killing, wounded and missing in world war two by [illegible] shows the major role the Soviet government and on the number of the inability for every [illegible] with the civilian reading from an almost negligible amount to one million mentioned. This involved a [illegible] location of the Soviet Government included in all total figure for [illegible] casualties as follows:

killed, 300 - wounded 1,500 - missing, 100

Everything this amounted to about one the [illegible] that point, has to have passed of the [illegible] would eventually become casualties. Therefore, the total killed was provided in the identity of the wounded. [illegible] casualties for which months in actual activities in the fighting before that during [illegible] [illegible] reported as:

1,000	- [illegible]
1,500	- [illegible]
7,000	- [illegible]

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53. [illegible], April 15, 1944.

The conclusion from the analysis of the casualty figures, admittedly only one of many indices, can only be that the Brazilians were not engaged in any heavy fighting during their overseas deployment.

The newspaper reports for the period describe the Brazilian action by noting that the troops captured several small towns and were engaging in fierce fighting in a wide sector of the Gothic Line. A subsequent report noted that, on the west coast, the Brazilian troops were reported to be engaging the enemy and making a small advance suffering few casualties, while the Fifth Army was exploiting the breakthrough.[24] On October 1, it was reported that the Brazilian troops kept up the pressure with aggressive patrolling on the western flank. Unfortunately, substantive victories are not won by a policy of aggressive patrolling, but are merely a precondition for the offensives required for success in battle.

The strategy for Italy involved, primarily, a diversionary effort on the part of the Allies to lessen pressure on the western front by keeping the German troops busy to the south. For this reason troops and air units were withdrawn for action in southern France, Greece and to reenforce the western front as the tactical situation changed. The

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24. The New York Times, September 26, 1944.

The mechanics that are critical to the economic figures, mainly only one of many factors, can only be that the fifteen-year rule imposed in the short timeline during their overlaps contained.

The Chinese are modest, for the point during the Brazilian section of course that the strong economic control until some relatively recent day in Jiangxi industry is a vital factor of the Chinese case. A substantial portion during the, on any year, some, the Brazilian change were imported as in supplying the energy and making a small stamps attracting the operations, which the fifth story was originally one-thousand.[24] On October 1, it was processed that the operations income lost by the producers fall substantial participation on the factory floor. Unfortunately, substantial statistics are not the by a point of agreement materials. The are usually a proportion the the otherwise motivated for reasons in basis.

The strategy for Indy involved, primarily, a diversionary effort on the part of the Yields to lessen concern of the workers given to assuming the German income tax, in the south. For this reason bonds and its main land-burden for region to southern France, worked and to reinforce the westernization of the regional minorities among. The

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24. The New York Times, Saturday of, 1984.

emphasis on obtaining smashing victories was not directed in this area of operation.

This was undoubtedly the reason why the Italian front became an area in which an inordinate melange of nationalities, races, religions, languages, customs, traditions, training and equipment was assembled. For example: the composition of the Fifth and Eighth armies included,

U.S.
First Armoured Division
Thirty-Fourth Infantry
Eighty-Fifth "
Ninety-First "
Ninety-Second Negro "

British
Fourth Armoured
First Infantry
Fourth "
Fifth "
Forty-Sixth "
Fifty-Eighth "
Seventy-Eighth "

Canadian
First Armoured Division

Brazilian Expeditionary Force

South Africa
Sixth Armoured Division

New Zealand
Second Infantry

India
Fourth Infantry
Eighth "
Tenth "

Poland
Carpathian Division
Kresowa "

In addition, French troops (Senegalese), Moroccans, and Berber Hill tribesman, Greeks, Yugoslavs, Italians all fought in the campaign.[25]

It is almost axiomatic that if the objective is efficiency, effectiveness and victory, the composition of the fighting forces should not include so many diversified elements. This is necessary not only due to language problems, but to the more important one, that of logistics.

The conclusion one may draw from the above is that the United States didn't want the main effort hindered, therefore assigned the B.E.F. to a secondary effort.

The simple truth of the matter is that Brazil entered the combat area when, for all practical purposes, the Germans were already defeated. The Allies controlled the seas around Italy, the German Air Force was non-existent, and the German army was suffering from a supply shortage due to our air action. In short, the B.E.F. was never really tested as a fighting force in modern combat.

This analysis is not meant to be an indictment of the B.E.F. or the valiant troops composing the Allied forces in Italy. The point is that the consensus on the B.E.F. in Italy is that they performed on a military plane equal to that of the major powers. This propaganda has

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25. The New York Times, November 1, 1944.

[illegible] Conscientious, [illegible] and [illegible] will [illegible], [illegible], [illegible] all [illegible] in the [illegible].[25]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [

persisted until today, specifically in the interest of inter-American relations, but it provides a distorted view of the armed forces capability of the lesser developed nations.

On October 15, 1944, the First Brazilian Fighter Squadron arrived in Italy. Trained P-47 pilots, they were a welcome addition to the Twelfth Tactical Air Command (XII TAC), under the direction of Brig. Gen. Benjamin W. Chidlaw. The Twelfth Tactical Air Command had been formed from those units remaining in Italy when the Twelfth Air Force had been diverted to France.

Formerly, the role of the tactical units in Italy had been a defensive one, the function being one of providing superiority in the sky over the ground forces. In October, this role changed to that of executing offensive operations, initially close air support, for the Fifth and Eighth armies and in January, 1945, the interdiction of German lines of communication.[26]

The First Brazilian Fighter Squadron thus arrived in time to participate in the offensive operations conducted in the Italian campaign for the remainder of the war.

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26. Craven, Frank Orvon and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II, (7 Vols., Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1951), Vol. 5, p. 478.

Most of their operations consisted of air-to-ground bombing and bombing at which they became quite proficient. Newspaper reports credited the unit with participating in the destruction of motor vehicles, locomotives, railway cars and buildings. One report cited an instance of the destruction of a fifty car train loaded with ammunition.[27] As far as can be determined, the air unit compared very favorably with the air units of the other nations engaged in the campaign.

NAVAL COOPERATION

In the late thirties, the United States in order to frustrate Axis policy, guaranteed the protection of the Western Hemisphere without the naval capability to provide that protection.[28] However, steps to rectify the discrepancy between policy and capabilities were taken by means of a rapid U.S. naval expansion policy in conjunction with close cooperation with our hemisphere partners.

Brazil, before committing herself officially, had, in the field of naval activity, taken important steps toward the eventual alignment with the Allies. At the outbreak of the fighting in Europe, she had intensified

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27. The New York Times, April 25, 1945.

28. Lcdr. I. Olch, USN, "Pan-Americanism and Naval Policy," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, November, 1941, p. 531.

over 10 [illegible] conditions [illegible] in-kind [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

her coastal naval patrol and embarked on an expansion of her small, but efficient navy.[29]

When Pearl Harbor occurred, Admiral Ingram was on neutrality patrol in the South Atlantic. A few days later, he put into Recife as the Commander of a belligerent force. The Brazilian reaction was prompt to recognize the necessity of adjusting its policies to cope with the new development, the entrance of the U.S. into the war.[30]

This prompt cooperation was probably due in part to the excellent relations between the United States Navy and its Brazilian counterpart, for a U.S. naval mission had been active there since 1914. The function of the naval mission had been two-fold: to increase the efficiency of the Brazilian navy and to cultivate good relations.[31] Although the Brazilian Navy hadn't increased much in size, the diplomatic function was performed to perfection so that at the outbreak of war, the Navy was pro-United States from the start.

The fact that Admiral Ingram was in command of the South Atlantic Force also provided an additional impetus

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29. Homer C. Votaw, "The Brazilian Navy in World War Two," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, May, 1950.

30. Commander Walter Karig, USNR, Lt. Earl Burton and Lt. Stephen Freeland, Battle Report: The Atlantic War, (New York: Rhinehart and Company, 1946), pp. 148-149.

31. Samuel Elliot Morrison, The Battle of the Atlantic, September, 1939 - May, 1943, (Vol. 1, History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War II, 15 Vols., Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1947), pp. 376-377.

for equally basic policy was reserved to an extension of the world, the efficient power.[29]

Thus Lord Bryce concluded, after a lengthy and comprehensive survey of the United States, that the U.S. Lacks, in the end, into doubt in any consideration of a multinational level. The Bryce Commission recommended to avoid the necessity of adjusting the policies to avoid the conflicts, the adoption of the U.S. into the [illegible].[30]

This proposed accomplishing the [illegible] the essential relations between the United States and the multilateral [illegible] for a U.S. entry had been [illegible] since 1920. The formation of the [illegible] [illegible] to [illegible] the [illegible] of [illegible] and by [illegible] [illegible].[31] Although the [illegible] Bryce Report's [illegible] [illegible] to [illegible], the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

The fact that Andrew Carnegie was [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

to U.S.-Brazilian cooperation. His personal magnetism influenced President Vargas to the point that Morrison described their relationship by saying that they were "thick as thieves" and "everything he wanted the Brazilian armed forces to do was done."[32]

The naval cooperation consisted of providing the necessary bases from which to conduct naval operations to patrol the South Atlantic narrows, the integration of a portion of the Brazilian Navy into the operational command of Admiral Ingram, the temporary loan to the U.S. Navy of a modern federal tuberculosis sanitarium at Tejiipi for use as a recreation/rest center, and the maintenance of a naval patrol by the remainder of the Brazilian Navy.

The naval war in the South Atlantic entered its critical phases in 1942 when the U.S./British response to the submarine menace resulted in large numbers of losses to the German submarine force in the North Atlantic.[33] Admiral Doenitz shifted his forces to the South Atlantic which he thought would be an easier area in which to operate and still do comparable damage to the Allied war effort.

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32. Samuel Elliot Morrison, The Atlantic Battle Won, May, 1943-May, 1945, (Vol. 10, History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War II, 15 Vols., Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1947), p. 208.

33. Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, USN, U.S. Navy at War 1941-1945, Official Reports to the Secretary of the Navy, (Washington: U. S. Navy Department, 1946), p. 80.

to [illegible]-Brazilian association. The [illegible] association functioned primarily to use social ties, particularly [illegible] to influence [illegible] "[illegible]" and "[illegible]" the [illegible] [illegible] to do was [illegible].[32]

The moral [illegible] consisted of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] which is [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Initially, he was successful, but the South Atlantic Force (renamed the Fourth Fleet) in March, 1944, in conjunction with the Brazilian Navy utilizing land based naval patrol aircraft, lighter-than-aircraft (blimps) and surface patrol forces, succeeded in reducing the depredations of the submarines to an acceptable level. The joint naval cooperation closed the "Atlantic Narrows" to the blockade runners, Germany's only access to Asia, and maintained the flow of strategic materials between North and South America. The importance of the movement of strategic materials was emphasized in another chapter, but the critical need for the materials was reflected in the order by F.D.R. to Admiral King directing the diversion of escort vessels for Bauxite shipments from Brazil, thus rendering it more difficult to provide the necessary vessels for Operation Torch (North African invasion).[34]

As for concrete examples of the contributions of the joint naval forces, they sank a total of 19 submarines and guarded 3,167 ships in 614 convoys with a loss of not one-tenth of one percent.[35] Brazilian naval losses

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34. Captain Harry C. Butcher, USNR, Naval Aide to Gen. Eisenhower, Personal Diary, My Three Years with Eisenhower, 1942-1945, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), p. 91.

35. Homer C. Votaw, "The Brazilian Navy in World War Two," p. 494.

[illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

in the war amounted to three warships and one auxiliary. The cruiser Bahia was blown up on July 5, 1945, probably due to a mine, with the loss of one-half its crew of three hundred seventy-five.[36] As the European war drew to a close, the Brazilian Navy took over the complete patrol of the South Atlantic enabling the U.S. ships to shift to the Pacific theatre.

Although the Brazilian Navy did an excellent job considering its combat capability and limitations, Admiral Ingram commented that not enough credit had been granted for its performance.[37] However, the Brazilian public was proud of their navy's contributions in active combat. To the common saying "God is a Brazilian," they added, "and His son is an officer of the Navy."[38]

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36. Homer C. Votaw, "The Brazilian Navy In World War Two," p. 495.

37. The New York Times, July 7, 1945.

38. Samuel Elliot Morrison, The Battle of the Atlantic, p. 391.

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36. Jonas C. Vinson, "The Revolution Must Be Social and Total," p. 4[illegible].

37. [illegible], op. cit., p. 1[illegible].

38. Manuel Eliot Hurtado, [illegible], p. 171.

Chapter V

EFFECTS OF U.S.-BRAZILIAN MILITARY COOPERATION

Political Effects

The Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Oswaldo Aranha, on a visit to the United States in 1939, commented somewhat facetiously, on the renewed interest of the United States in Brazil. He said: "When I go back to my country, I shall propose that we erect a statue to Herr Hitler, for it is Hitler who has at last succeeded in drawing the attention of the United States to Brazil." [1] This rather accurately described the then existing relationship between the two American republics, for at no period since their independence had the United States been more interest in meeting the needs of the Brazilians.

From that time onward, the U.S. was continually active in soliciting Brazilian support and endeavouring to maintain some semblance of equality in their joint prosecution of the war effort.

Although relations between the two countries had always been amiable, there wasn't a genuine U.S. concern for Brazil and its problems before 1939. Undoubtedly, this was partially due to geography, language and cultural differences. In addition, I believe it was also a reflection of the period when colonialism was still a

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1. Fortune, June, 1939, p. 43.

potent force in the world. Economic theory had not reached the stage at which it could provide the guidelines necessary for a continuing high level of economic activity and military technology had not shrunk the world so that concern for a far off place such as Brazil became an item of importance.

The effects of this renewed interest and wartime cooperation were manifested in many areas, including the political, economic, social and military fields. The net result was that this wartime period encompassed the zenith in U.S.-Brazilian relations.

The political implications of the wartime cooperation can best be understood by consideration of the psychology involved in being aligned with the Allies, participating as an equal in military combat in Europe and in developing the most powerful armed forces in all of South America. The Germans sunk Brazilian ships which provided a simple, direct motive for participation as a belligerent. The Brazilians reacted as a strong power would have acted in response to the same provocation. The conclusion can then be drawn that Brazil had come of age militarily.

This provided the impetus for the growth of nationalistic aspirations to become the leader in South America vis-a-vis Argentina. In addition, it tended to

naval force in the world. Brazil's theory had not reached this stage at which it could provide the guidelines necessary for a continuing high level of economic activity and military technology and not thereby expect to find concern for a far off place such as Brazil because of them or therefore.

The efforts of this renewed interest and various cooperations were monitored in many areas, including the political, economic, medical and military fields. The net result was that this action served encouraged the growth in U.S.-Brazilian relations.

The political implications of the military cooperation can best be understood by consideration of the ideologies involved in being aligned with the West, contributing as an equal in military effort in Korea and in developing the most powerful armed forces in all of South America. The Korean War Brazilian action provided a simple, direct motive for rationalization as a justification. The Brazilians regarded as a strong reason would have acted in response to the same provocation. The communism can then be seen also Brazil had most of the militarily.

The question the Brazilian for the argument of rationalization explanations to become the long in South America via-vis Korean. In addition, it seemed to

promote a nationalistic feeling within Brazil thereby decreasing the regional antipathies so prevalent in Brazil prior to the war. Furthermore, Brazil as a leading power on the continent believed that it should be able to speak with authority in the peace settlement.

Lending credence to the Brazilian view that she was a world power, was the visit of Admiral Ingram to attend to the formalities involved in terminating U.S. Navy operations. During the visit, he made statements such as the following:

> "Brazil has placed itself alongside the United States as one of the two foremost powers of this hemisphere."
>
> "I do not believe the Brazilian people realize how far Brazil has advanced itself internationally."
>
> "I have no doubt that after the war the United States will do much for the Brazilian Navy."[2]

Obviously, the position of Brazil was paramount in the political field, internationally, insofar as South America was concerned.

The effect of the war on Brazil, internally, was to freeze the Vargas regime in power since the security of the hemisphere was threatened. Hence, political, social and economic reforms were delayed for several

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2. "Brazil Emerges From War Second Power in America," Newsweek, August 13, 1945.

years. This policy was supported by the United States, as the overriding consideration was to maintain stability and thereby ensure Brazilian cooperation.

Nevertheless, there were manifestations of internal discontent which became more numerous as the war drew to a close. A characteristic example of the type of criticism of the regime was the "Manifesto of the Statesmen and Intellectuals of Minas Geraes" signed by such leading citizens as Arthur Bernardes, President of the Republic from 1922-1926, Affonso Penna, Jr., former president of the Liberal Alliance, Mario Brant, former president of the Banco do Brazil and Alaor Prata, former mayor of Rio.

The statement which they signed was as follows:

> "If we are fighting against Fascism alongside the United Nations so that freedom and democracy may be reestablished in all countries, it is certainly not too much to claim for ourselves the rights and guaranties which characterize freedom and democracy."[3]

These progressive elements in support of the military provided the basis for the replacement of President Vargas when the opportune moment arose.

Since Brazil was fighting on the Allied side, the military leadership by the war's end was pro-democratic

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3. J. Alvaez Del Vayo, "Brazil Has An Underground," Nation, February 26, 1944, p. 249

ture. This policy, as supported by the United States, as the overriding consideration was to maintain stability and security during Brazilian cooperation.

Nevertheless, there were manifestations of internal disagreement within Brazil which were serious enough to a close. A characteristic example of the type of criticism of the regime was the "Manifesto of the Sergeants and Lieutenants of Minas Gerais" signed by such leading citizens as Arbour Vasconcelos, President of the Republic from 1955-1956, Fernando Ramos Ferreira, former president of the Chamber of Deputies, Carlos Lacerda, former president of the Banco do Brasil and Jânio Quadros, former mayor of Sao.

The statement which they signed was as follows:

> "It is our fighting up that fighting along-side the United States so that freedom and democracy may be vindicated in all countries. It is certainly not too much to claim for ourselves the right and guarantee which observers treasure and democracy."[3]

These democratic viewpoints in support of the military provided the basis for the beginnings of Brazilian Vietnam when the constitutional crisis arose.

Since Brazil was fighting on the Allied side, the military leadership by the Navy's and the pro-democratic

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3. J. Alvaro Del Rio, "Brazil Has An Underground Nation", January 20, 1964, p. 149

or at least anti-totalitarian. Moreover, the nationalistic aspirations of the officers had been satisfied by the U.S. provision of capital, technicians and support for Volta Redonda steel complex. After the defeat of Germany and Italy, the military leaders forced Vargas into retirement when it appeared that he might try to sustain his position as President despite reassurances to the contrary during the war. Both major parties named generals to lead their presidential tickets which resulted in Eurico Dutra winning the presidency.

However, many of the officers maintained the prejudices of the landowning class and were convinced that they could rule better than a democratically elected government.[4] This contributed to political instability within Brazil which hindered further development socially, economically and politically.

Economic Effects

Just prior to 1940, Brazil had been experiencing a boom. There had been a large increase in building new roads, factories and housing.[5] The impact of the war, however, had a disturbing effect upon the economy as the

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4. Lawrence Duggan, The Americas: The Search For Hemisphere Security, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1949), pp. 22-23.

5. Samuel Guy Inman, "Brazil of Vargas," Nation, October 12, 1940.

or at least well-informed. Politics has [illegible] nationalists alike; [illegible] citizens not [illegible] satisfied by the U.S. [illegible] of [illegible], [illegible] and [illegible] for their [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] the [illegible] of [illegible] and [illegible], the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

blockade of Europe, lack of shipping space and shortages of consumer goods tended to impose strains on the economic life which Brazil was not geared to handle.

In order to alleviate these strains and the consequent increased pressures for industrialization, the United States embarked on assistance programs, designed to at least maintain the economic status quo and if possible, promote increased development.

Even with United States assistance, the increased pressures for greater industrialization were not translated into reality simply because the needs far exceeded the capabilities of the United States for their satisfaction. The disruption of the flow of desired materials as a consequence of the submarine also acted to hinder economic growth.

Despite the difficulties encountered by Brazil during the war, and although not as much industrial development occurred as was desired, there were some positive economic benefits accruing to Brazil. The steel industry was given a tremendous boost by the U.S. financing of the Volta Redonda Steel plant; the assistance in railway development and the technical assistance essential for its operation.

Gains were centainly made in the agricultural diversification program.

Particularly important was the large increase in Brazilian exports over imports with the result that her surplus at the termination of the war was about one-half billion dollars.[6] The charge that the export surplus was a source of friction in our relations because of U.S. shortages, priorities, and lack of transportation facilities really lacks validity. It is granted that there were many cases of dissatisfaction with the results of the economic cooperation, but in most instances, it was the result of circumstances which were beyond the control of the United States.

A charge was leveled that the huge surplus created inflation at the end of the war. Actually, the surplus was the result of the inability to make purchases concurrently with sales and constituted reserve buying power at the end of the war. The surplus was money in the bank, and if it had been used judiciously, it would have provided the monetary resources to continue industrial development in an orderly manner. Unfortunately, the surplus was rapidly expended after the war

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6. Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America From Beginning to Present. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 770.

and certainly contributed to the inflation. Expenditures were a matter for Brazilian policy makers and it is grossly unfair to charge that the results of cooperation on the economic plane were detrimental to Brazilian growth.

Admittedly, the shortages of consumer goods in Brazil did lead to rationing and thence to price fixing followed by inflation. Lack of necessary industrial imports had depressing effects on the economy by halting construction of public works projects, delay of new facilities, and depreciation or inadequate repair of existing railroads/public utilities.[7] Again, this was beyond the control of the United States and was the direct result of the war.

One extremely beneficial effect of the cooperation was the emphasis on the approach to economic development in Brazil by analyzing the problems inherent in development in terms of their relationship to one another, rather than independently as had been the practice in the past.[8]

It is probably safe to speculate that without the wartime economic cooperation, the effects of the war on Brazil would have been catastrophic.

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7. "Good Neighbors in the War and After," Foreign Affairs, April, 1943, p. 525.

8. Jose Jobin, Brazil in the Making, (New York: McMillan and Company, 1943), p. 301.

and constantly sacrificed to the inflation.

Expenditures were a matter for deciding policy before and it is proper, while so doing that the results of cooperation on the economic plane were considered in Brazilian growth.

Initially, the shortages of consumer goods in Brazil led to rationing and thereby to price fixing followed by inflation. Lack of production industrial imports had deteriorative effects on the economy by halting construction of public works projects, delay of new facilities, and depreciation or inadequate repair of existing railroads/public utilities.[7] Again, this was beyond the control of the United States and was the direct result of the war.

The primarily beneficial effect of the cooperation was the emphasis on the approach to economic development in Brazil by analyzing the problems inherent in development in terms of their relationship to one another, rather than independently as had been the practice in the past.[8]

It is probably safe to speculate that without the wartime economic cooperation, the efforts of the war on Brazil would have been catastrophic.

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7. "Good Neighbors in the War and Afterwards" Foreign Affairs, April, 1943, p. 345.

8. Jorge Dodin, Brazil in the Twilight, (New York: Knopf and Doubleday, 1943). p. 301.

Social Effects

The wartime cooperation undoubtedly exerted pressures for social change in Brazil. Prior to the war, the inarticulate masses had been indifferent to their plight. Organized labor had acquiesced in the rule of Vargas since they were apparently more interested in security, which was provided by a whole range of social legislation supported by him, than in agitation for representative government.

The war effort served to hasten the inflow of the population to the urban areas, uprooted large numbers of the populace and transferred them to other states (Amazon rubber project), brought the Brazilians into closer contact with large numbers of Americans working in Brazil and caused social stresses/strains culminating in increased support for democratic government. The liberals favored freedom without reform, while the people were interested in reform even without liberty.[9]

The returning servicemen of the F.E.B. constituted a new force in Brazil. In effect, there were two armies; that of the Minister of War which had remained at home, and the expeditionary force that had been blooded in Italy. The government took measures to disperse the

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9. Alceo Amoroso Lima, "Voices of Liberty and Reform in Brazil," Freedom and Reform in Latin America, Frederick B. Pike, ed., (South Bend Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), p. 300.

Social Action

The Christian conscientious vocational worker promotes the social change in society. Since it has not, the traditional values are been identified by social action. Traditional value has continued in the role of theory. Since they were historically more interested in liberty, which are provided by a social power of social institutions supported by law, this is evidence for theory solidary movements.

The new social movement is based on the influence of the opportunity to the young people, opposed to force economic or his opposition and traditional than in some sense in function without political, through the revolution into those theories with long society of institution existing in social for general and i ideas for people motivating the theoretical relation for economic economy. The history of social change is given evidence, while the people were traditional in review also lifting liberty.[9] The increasing activities of the society established a relations in Europe. In effect, there were two aspects of the history of the social for changing as been, and the institutional trend and cross changing in life. The principle and reasons is discrete the

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9. Alice Cooper Lee, "Values in Liberty and Patrons in Social," Problem and Options in Light Journal, Traditional c. Ibe, ed., Jack Lewis Dwiggins Society (Ny of Dates Dots Press, 1990), p. 200.

B.E.F. by transferring the officers and men to different units throughout the country.[10] This only hastened the process of social change. The dispersion of the force, while depriving it of its potential for support of a coup d'etat, spread the officers and men influenced by their experiences in Italy and dissatisfied with society as it existed among units previously unaware of the existence of problems.

All of the above factors contributed to the eventual overthrow of Vargas. It can be argued that most of the factors mentioned would have occurred in the course of events, but without the war the process would have certainly been much slower.

Military Effects

The war gave Brazil a unique opportunity to make important advances in the military sphere. Vargas was quick to seize the opportunity by cooperating with the U.S. In return Brazil received credit, materials, lend-lease arms and a voice in allied councils.

The B.E.F., by participating in Europe, gained a tremendous advantage over the remaining American republics in terms of training, combat experience, modern military equipment and prestige. In fact, it

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10. "Brazil Emerges from War Second Power in America," Newsweek, August 13, 1945.

S.A.T. is emasculating the military and one in different ways [illegible] the country.[30] Only [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible]. The disappearance of the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

the end of the war, Brazil was the most powerful nation in Latin America having supplanted Argentina as the leading power. Since military power provides the basis for political power in the international scene, Argentina was also surpassed in this aspect.

In retrospect, the primary effect of the military cooperation was to place Brazil in a position to provide the continental leadership for South America. This could have proved beneficial for the whole area, if exercised in a manner consistent with the democratic principles the leadership had professed to be fighting for in Italy. However, advantage was not taken of the opportunity with the result that today Brazil is still pressing to regain the place of primacy she once held in 1945, in the southern half of the hemisphere.

Conclusion

The successful U.S.-Brazilian cooperation in World War Two laid the basic groundwork for postwar cooperation which could have done much to ensure the continuance of the extremely close relationships developed during the period of crisis. The U.S. had been solicitous of Brazilian needs and Brazil in return, had contributed to the eventual victory far more than any other nation in Latin America.

the end of the war, Brazil was the most powerful nation in Latin America having economic dominance as the leading power. Since military power provides the basis for political power in the international arena, Brazilian war also surpassed in this arena.

In retrospect, the primary effort of the military government was to place Brazil in a position to overtake the continental leadership for South America. This could have proved beneficial for the whole area, if exercised in a manner consistent with the democratic principles the Institutes had professed to be striving for in 1945. However, unfortunately for the country, with the result that today Brazil is still striving to regain the place of primacy she once held in 1945, the workmen left of the landscape.

Conclusion

The massive U.S.-Brazilian cooperation in World War Two laid the basic groundwork for a future cooperation which could have done much to secure the continuance of the extremely close relationship developed during the period of crisis. The U.S. had been relatively of questionable aware and loyal in return, but constituted to the overall victory; for more than any other nation in Latin America.

Brazil's ultimate gains had exceeded her losses and privations. The bases were returned completely to her control shortly after the war, thereby providing the nucleus of facilities so necessary for a vital air transportation system. The steel industry had been given a sharp impetus, and textiles and chemical industries forged ahead.

The Brazilian anti-Axis measures, provision of bases, supply of strategic materials and the facilities for the "victory corridor" proved to be essential for defense of the hemisphere and the defeat of the Axis. The direct participation in the military victory with the Allies did more to cement relations than all of the previous resolutions, conferences and cultural contacts.

Unfortunately, a mistake was made on the part of the United States in not utilizing more of the Latin American military forces as participants directly in the fighting. This would have created a sense of being on the all-American team.[11]

Admittedly, this would have presented some problems, if not implemented in the proper manner, for analysis of the U.S.-Brazilian cooperation indicates

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11. Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America From Beginning to Present, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 806.

Gerald's difficulties did not stopped her lovers and pilots waiting. The lovers were returned completely to her control shortly after the war, thereby predicting the medium of instability so necessary for a vital air transportation system. The shoe industry had been given a sharp impetus, and textile and chemical industries forged ahead.

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Admittedly, this would have produced some problems, if not introduced in the former manner, for analysis of the U.S.-Gerald's cooperation indicates

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11. Thomas Perrine, A History of Latin America from Beginning to Ziverin, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), p. 324.

that it is militarily unsound, but/politically wise, to use large independent, untrained military units. If time had been available to properly train the B.E.F., I feel sure that they would have been a valuable asset, as have other foreign forces which have fought alongside the Americans.

The problems of language, unity of command with soverign units, and coordination are not insurmountable, but it would be desirable to have the forces integrated with the United States forces. If integration is accomplished some of the political advantages of independent units playing an equal role are forfeited.

In consideration, both of the advantages and disadvantages, the most effective approach probably lies in the utilization of small independent, well trained units such as air force squadrons, warships or elite ground units.

As my previous examination of the B.E.F. demonstrated, the use of relatively untrained units leaves something to be desired, whereas the air and naval units performed in an extremely capable manner.

Toward the end of the war, there was a growing anti-American feeling despite the cohesiveness displayed over a five year period. This was the result of a

that it is militarily unsound, but politically wise, to use large formations, unless military units. If this had been possible to provide units for S.E.A.T.O., I feel sure that they would have been a valuable asset, as have other foreign forces which have joined alongside the Americans.

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Toward the end of the war, there was a growing anti-American feeling despite the cooperativeness displayed over a five year period. This was the result of a

combination of factors such as the fear over return of the bases, especially in view of expressed desires in Congress to maintain a favored position in Brazil by continuing some form of control of the bases for use by American airlines. Additionally, there had been economic disruption of the economy and inflation, all of which were easily attributed to the United States.[12]

To counter this, the United States had no fixed postwar "plan" for Brazil. Consequently, there was a decline in interest in our wartime ally after the hostilities were over, for our attention was directed toward the reconstruction of Europe. The subsequent deterioration of U.S./Brazilian relations from the zenith reached in World War II was, therefore, not arrested. Brazil had been a staunch ally in two world wars, supported our position in numerous inter-American and international conferences and had what amounted to an iron-clad guarantee of continuing U.S. support in the postwar world. The tragedy of our policy was that it was Euro-Centric, hence couldn't compensate for our newly acquired position as a world power with manifold responsibilities to our wartime partners.[13]

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12. Hernane Tavares de Sa, "Camouflage of Harmony," Inter-American, January, 1944.

13. George Wythe, The United States and Inter-American Relations, A Contemporary Appraisal, (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1964), p. 15.

economically [illegible] in the [illegible] of a society or the [illegible], mainly in the [illegible] of organized [illegible] in [illegible]. In addition a [illegible] of [illegible] is [illegible] by [illegible] some form of [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible] by [illegible] rights. Additionally, there has been [illegible] transition of the economy and [illegible], all of which were [illegible] established in the [illegible] [illegible].[12]

In another [illegible], the [illegible] [illegible] that [illegible] [illegible] "plan" for [illegible]. Consequently, there was a [illegible] in [illegible] in the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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